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Fault-tolerant distributed systems often handle failures in two steps: first, detect the
failure and, second, take some recovery action. A common approach to detecting fail-
ures is end-to-end timeouts, but using timeouts brings problems. First, timeouts are
inaccurate: just because a process is unresponsive does not mean that process has failed.
Second, choosing a timeout is hard: short timeouts can exacerbate the problem of in-
accuracy, and long timeouts can make the system wait unnecessarily. In fact, a good
timeout value—one that balances the choice between accuracy and speed—may not
even exist, owing to the variance in a system’s end-to-end delays.
is dissertation posits a new approach to detecting failures in distributed sys-
tems: use information about failures that is local to each component, e.g., the contents
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of an OS’s process table. We call such information inside information, and use it as the ba-
sis in the design and implementation of three failure reporting services for data center
applications, which we call Falcon, Albatross, and Pigeon.
Falcon deploys a network of software modules to gather inside information in
the system, and it guarantees that it never reports a working process as crashed by some-
times terminating unresponsive components. is choice helps applications by making
reports of failure reliable, meaning that applications can treat them as ground truth. Un-
fortunately, Falcon cannot handle network failures because guaranteeing that a process
has crashed requires network communication; we address this problem in Albatross and
Pigeon. Instead of killing, Albatross blocks suspected processes from using the network,
allowing applications to make progress during network partitions. Pigeon renounces in-
terference altogether, and reports inside information to applications directly and with
more detail to help applications make better recovery decisions.
By using these services, applications can improve their recovery from failures
both quantitatively and qualitatively. Quantitatively, these services reduce detection
time by one to two orders of magnitude over the end-to-end timeouts commonly used
by data center applications, thereby reducing the unavailability caused by failures. Qual-
itatively, these services provide more specific information about failures, which can
reduce the logic required for recovery and can help applications better decide when
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How can we build reliable systems out of unreliable components?
Answering this question amounts to constructing fault-tolerant systems; such sys-
tems pervade our lives: from engineering (suspension bridges support traffic even if a
single nut is missing), to commerce (banks remain open even if tellers need to stay
home sick), and even entertainment (an understudy steps in if an actor literally breaks
a leg). Likewise, fault tolerance permeates the design of computer systems: the layout of
circuits that are correct despite flaws in silicon, the codes and protocols that carry data
through an error-prone medium, and the websites from the Internet that are (almost)
always available.
In this dissertation, we restrict our focus to a single kind of computer system:
fault-tolerant distributed systems. is choice is motivated by the advent of data centers
as a substrate for building highly available web services. e challenge is that data
centers are often built with low-cost and failure-prone components, but the reliability
of services they host is paramount: these services are replacing desktop applications in
many domains and any downtime means losing users, revenue, and trust.
e fault-tolerant distributed systems that underly these services often handle
failures in two steps: first, determine that a component process has failed and, second,
take some recovery action to mitigate that failure. We are interested in building sys-
tems that handle failures quickly, since users are willing to wait mere seconds on web
services [ ]. To this end, this dissertation focuses on the problem of fast failure detection,
though we acknowledge the interplay between these two steps and note complementary
work on fast failure recovery [ , , , ].
We hypothesize that the relative lack of attention to fast failure detection owes to
the fundamental difficulty of the problem and its widespread (but imperfect) solution:
timeouts. e challenging kernel in the problem of detecting failures is distinguishing
between that which has truly failed and that which is just slow. is difficulty is re-
latable: should you continue waiting for a delayed bus or catch a cab, how many times
should you let a phone ring before hanging up, should you wait for your date’s arrival
or start drinking alone?
e widespread-but-imperfect solution to this hard problem is to use a timeout:
after some fixed period of time, start treating the unresponsive party as failed (catch a
cab, hang up, or drown your sorrows). In fault-tolerant distributed systems this solution
is called end-to-end timeouts; with end-to-end timeouts, a process of the system considers
another process to be failed if that process is unresponsive for some length of time.
End-to-end timeouts are problematic for two reasons. First, timeouts are inac-
curate: just because a timeout fires does not mean there is a failure. Such mistakes can
cause incorrect behavior if handled haphazardly; for example, in a system where some
process serves as backup for some master process, the backup might take over for a func-
tioning master, thereby causing a split-brain scenario where two processes believe that
they have exclusive access to some shared resource (e.g., a database). To avoid incorrect
behavior, applications currently cope with inaccuracy from end-to-end timeouts with
several techniques; the common theme among these techniques is that they convert in-
accurate suspicions into something that the distributed system can treat as ground truth
(e.g., by requiring a majority of processes to agree that a suspected process should be
ostracized or by forcefully terminating suspected processes).
e second problem with timeouts is that they trigger a troublesome trade-off:
a long timeout increases a system’s delay in responding to failure, but a short timeout
exacerbates the problems of inaccuracy. To make matters worse, there may not even be a
good timeout value [ ]: exponential backoff in the network, disk access, and scheduling
can all contribute delay that varies by several orders of magnitude even under normal
conditions.
* * *
is dissertation addresses the shortcomings of end-to-end timeouts by proposing a
new approach to detecting failures in distributed systems: use information about failures
that is local to each component. We call such information inside information, and it is plen-
tiful: applications have internal performance counters for tracking progress, operating
systems have a process table that definitively lists working processes, and computer
networks have dedicated protocols [ ] for communicating the status of network com-
ponents (switches, routers, and links) to network administrators.
We are interested in using inside information to build failure reporting services that aid
distributed systems in handling failures; this approach brings three challenges:
Systematically collecting inside information. Abstraction conveniently hides themess-
ier details of a system’s internals, but gathering inside information requires sifting
through exactly those details under adverse conditions (i.e., when there are failures).
Not only must a failure reporting service’s design be principled (so that the service’s
properties can be analyzed and its implementation improved), but its design and im-
plementation must span many layers of the system. In our target setting, distributed
systems in data centers, these layers of abstraction include applications, operating sys-
tems, virtual machines, networks, and more.
Defining an interface for reporting failures. A failure reporting service that uses in-
side information must coherently present a diverse set of information to applications.
Even if the service simply uses the binary classification of “up” and “down”, it still must
define what those reports mean. Furthermore, binary classification could be inappro-
priate for certain kinds of failures. For example, the networks found in data centers
are themselves fault-tolerant systems designed to carry traffic even if some switch or
router fails, but the network may be unusable while it recovers. If two processes are
disconnected during network recovery, how should the failure reporting service report
their status? Should the service report both as “down”, choose one over the other, or
report both as “up”? Does it matter whether the network’s recovery is fast or slow?
Limiting negative impact. In addition to the positive impact of providing informa-
tion about failures quickly, a failure reporting service can have two negative impacts
that should be limited. First, a failure reporting service can consume resources when
gathering inside information, e.g., by constantly polling a component’s status. Because
failures occur infrequently, a failure reporting service should avoid tying up too many
resources in their detection but without giving up fast detection time. Second, the fail-
ure reporting service might affect components of the system, so as to better determine
their status, for example, by terminating an erratic component. Such termination should
be rare, and it should be limited in its scope.
is dissertation examines the trade-offs in addressing these challenges through the
design, implementation, and evaluation of three failure reporting services:
Falcon (Chapter ). Falcon systematically collects inside information with a network
of spy modules, or spies. Spies are layer-specific monitoring logic with a common in-
frastructure and protocol for reporting failures. Falcon exposes to its clients a reliable
failure detector interface: clients query Falcon to learn about the failure of processes, and
if Falcon reports that a process is “down” then that process has actually crashed. In
underwriting this guarantee, Falcon grants its spies a license to kill when they suspect
some layer has crashed, following the old technique of “shooting the other node in the
head” ( ). To limit its negative impact, Falcon employs a carefully designed
callback-based architecture so that clients do not need to poll for fast reports, and it
limits the scope of its killing to suspected components rather than whole machines.
Albatross (Chapter ). Falcon’s approach fails in the presence of network partitions:
if a spy cannot communicate that a layer has crashed, Falcon cannot report any process
failures caused by that crash. We observe that network partitions in data centers are
generally small, so a failure reporting service might permanently disconnect the smaller
partition to provide fast and reliable information about failures.
appears to have existed as folklore knowledge since the s, though to our knowledge no
publication formally claims it as a contribution.
Of course, wholesale disconnection just to give reliable information would be
insane; in the worst case, it could mean disconnecting hundreds of hosts to deal with a
single problematic process. However, programmable network interfaces, such as those
exposed by software defined network (SDNs), can allow a failure reporting service to
target specific processes for disconnection and avoid disrupting processes that do not
care about fast failure reporting (such as background data processing tasks).
Leveraging this observation, we build a failure reporting service called Albatross
that disconnects only its monitored processes. Albatross also uses SDNs to systemati-
cally collect inside information about the failures of network elements and end-hosts;
for handling process failures, Albatross borrows from Falcon. However, the seman-
tics of permanent disconnection are different from those of a reliable failure detector:
what happens when disconnected processes communicate with one another? To address
this question, we formally specify the guarantees of Albatross’s mechanism for making
reports reliable. By leveraging SDNs (and Falcon’s architecture for monitoring pro-
cesses), Albatross responds to failures quickly and at a low cost; this combination is
because Albatross re-uses the monitoring already done by SDNs and does not require
clients to poll.
Pigeon (Chapter ). Falcon and Albatross crash machines or disconnect processes
to give reliable reports, but this is disruptive. We observe that distributed systems are
already well-equipped to handle unreliable information due to the prevalence of end-to-
end timeouts. is prompts the question of how a failure monitoring service can expose
to applications its inside information (which may not be reliable), without requiring
these applications to understand the specific details of such information? In Pigeon, we
propose a new interface, called a failure informer, for that purpose. e failure informer
distinguishes four failure conditions, where each may trigger a different kind of recovery
action or even no recovery at all.
Pigeon systematically collects information about failures by extending Falcon’s
architecture to monitor the network (without assuming a SDN), with the goal of re-
purposing existing network monitoring where possible. is architecture avoids the
negative impact of killing and helps keep Pigeon’s costs low.
* * *
Before continuing, we share an important conclusion of this work:
Timeouts are inevitable. Even with inside information, we cannot eliminate the fun-
damental difficulty of distinguishing slow and failed components. For example, if an
application fails to update a performance counter it is hard to tell if the process is dead-
locked or, alternatively, if it is working hard on a challenging computation. However,
inside information sidesteps this difficulty because the absolute costs in the trade-off
for choosing a good timeout are mitigated by scale: a very long period of unrespon-
siveness locally may be very short from an end-to-end perspective (e.g., in Google’s
clusters, even heavily loaded machines rarely take longer than milliseconds to sched-
ule a runnable thread [ ]). is observation can be used to set conservative timeouts
locally that have much faster detection time than similarly conservative end-to-end
timeouts. Furthermore, local timeouts can be set relative to resources other than real-
time (e.g., how many cycles a process has been given); this can prevent conditions
like high load from being mistaken for failure.
Timeouts are also inevitable because inside information may lack coverage; even
if all of the service’s inside information says that a distributed system is healthy, that
system may be stuck because of an unresponsive and unmonitored component. In this
case, only end-to-end unresponsiveness indicates failure, and thus end-to-end timeouts
must serve as a backstop mechanism for determining that something has failed, even
when the vast majority of failures can be detected by inside information.
Roadmap. Chapter contains an overview of work related to this dissertation. Chap-
ters – describe Falcon, Albatross, and Pigeon. Albatross and Pigeon extend Falcon,
and so assume familiarity with Chapter , but Chapters & can be read independently
of each other. Chapter summarizes and critiques all three systems, and so assumes
familiarity with the rest of the dissertation.
Chapter
Related work
is chapter describes related work in failure detection, other services for distributed
systems, and network monitoring. We also give an overview of work at the intersection
of distributed systems and networking.
. e theory and practice of failure detection
Chandra and Toueg formalized the theory of failure detectors in a seminal paper [ ].
Specifically, they define a failure detector as a set of per-process oracles that each re-
turn a list of crashed processes when queried by their local process; the authors classify
failure detectors based on the kinds of mistakes such lists can contain. Chandra and
Toueg’s main result is that unreliable failure detectors—those which sometimes mistake
working processes for ones that have crashed—can be used to solve hard problems in
distributed computing. e importance of this result is twofold: first, it succinctly cap-
tures the minimal assumptions required to solve certain fundamental problems; second,
it introduces a simple and useful model for developing and reasoning about distributed
algorithms.
Chandra and Toueg presented another important result in showing that perfect
failure detectors, which never mistake working processes as crashed, permit simpler im-
plementations of certain distributed algorithms. is result, along with the subsequent
establishment of the theoretical advantages of fast perfect failure detectors [ ], inspired
early work on this dissertation, specifically in the development of Falcon (Chapter )
and its preceding workshop paper [ ].
We were not alone in our inspiration: Chandra and Toeug’s work inspired the
design and implementation of both unreliable and perfect failure detectors. Much work
has focused on choosing end-to-end timeout values used internally by failure detectors.
Chen et al. [ ] propose a failure detector that uses heuristics to select an end-to-end
timeout adaptively based on delay and loss measurements. Bertier et al. [ ] follow a
similar method for estimating timeout values, but their failure detector makes differ-
ent initial assumptions about the network. So and Sirer [ ] developed a failure de-
tector that uses assumptions about the underlying reliability of different components
to minimize delay and bandwidth according to an optimization strategy. ese works
are complementary and could improve the choice of backstop timeout values in this
dissertation’s failure reporting services.
Fezter [ ] designed and implemented a perfect failure detector using watch-
dogs, which are hardware components that reboot machines if they do not receive peri-
odic messages. Similarly, the Linux-HA project [ ] provides a service called Heartbeat,
which is a failure detector based on end-to-end timeouts; this service can be configured
to use a hardware watchdog (like Fetzer’s failure detector), or to send RPCs that shut
down suspected machines (real or virtual). Both of these mechanisms are a form of
(“shoot the other node in the head”), which is an old technique for convert-
ing suspicion into fact. ese works partially inspired our use of in Falcon
(Chapter ) and in Albatross (Chapter ).
Accrual failure detectors [ ] forgo binary classification and instead output a
numerical value such that, roughly speaking, higher values mean there is a higher prob-
ability that a process has crashed. In practice [ ], applications consider the output to
be an indication of failure if it is above a certain threshold, but they can adjust this
threshold on the fly; this is similar to how adaptive failure detectors work [ , ], but
with more flexibility given to the failure detector’s clients. Expanding the failure de-
tector interface to expose confidence is similar to the approach of Pigeon (Chapter ),
which expands the failure detector interface to expose uncertainty.
Other work has used the failure detector abstraction to improve other aspects of
end-to-end timeout based failure detection. For example, large process groups some-
times require pairwise monitoring, but the quadratic message complexity of a naïve
implementation is costly. van Renesse et al. [ ] address this problem with a failure
detector that uses a gossip protocol to quickly and efficiently disseminate failure infor-
mation. is technique is useful for failure detectors that use keep-alive messages, but
it is unnecessary for the callback-based architectures used in this dissertation.
. Other services for building distributed systems
Many services facilitate the design and implementation of distributed systems. ese
services operate at a different level of abstraction than failure reporting services, but
they themselves are distributed systems and can thus benefit from fast failure reporting.
Group communication services [ , ] (GCS) maintain a view of processes and
provide multicast within a view. ese services force applications into a particular
design pattern, hence they are less general-purpose than a failure reporting service.
However, a fast failure reporting service could improve how quickly GCS respond to
failure (since GCS themselves are distributed systems). Early GCS used mechanisms
of self-killing and exclusion for converting suspected failures into actual failures, and
these mechanisms inspired some choices in our work; in fact, the exclusion mechanism
of [ ] is highlighted in Chandra and Toueg’s treatise on failure detectors as an
example of converting suspicion into fact [ , § ].
[ ] tracks the mutual connectivity of a set of processes and guarantees
that all processes will be notified if any process becomes crashed or partitioned.
guarantees symmetric notification of failure; this contrasts Albatross’s asymmetric guar-
antees (Chapter , § . ). However, ’s guarantees are weaker than Albatross’s: if a
pair of processes sees that their group has failed, gives no guarantee that the fail-
ure is not a temporary network problem, and so the processes must take care to avoid
a split-brain scenario.
Con guration services. Distributed systems often need to share small amounts
of configuration information (membership lists, access control, meta-data, etc.); sev-
eral services have been developed to facilitate this sharing for distributed systems built
in data centers [ , ]. An important aspect of these services is that they include a
mechanism for detecting failures by using leases [ ]. If some client processes want to
monitor a target process, the target process creates a special kind of meta-data at the
configuration service. e target processes must periodically refresh this meta-data by
sending a message to the configuration service, and if the target process fails to re-
fresh by some deadline, the configuration service removes the meta-data (marking the
process as crashed) and notifies the client processes.
Configuration services can be overloaded when configured to use short end-to-
end timeouts to detect failures quickly (see Chubby [ , § . ] and Chapter , § . . ).
For this reason, we believe that configuration services can be enhanced by using a fast
failure monitoring service, such as those described in this dissertation.
Replication libraries. State-machine replication [ , ] is a common approach
for building fault-tolerant distributed systems; in fact, Albatross (Chapter ) uses it
internally. e replicated state machine approach is predicated on the observation that
a state machine’s behavior is determined by its inputs and their order. us, building
a reliable state machine is equivalent to replicating a log of its inputs; this approach
requires detecting and recovering from failures, and can thus benefit from fast failure
reporting services.
We make special note of two services related to those described in this disserta-
tion: the fault-tolerant common object request broker architecture [ ] and
the leader election service of Schiper and Toueg [ , ]. uses a monitoring
hierarchy that is structurally similar to the systems described in this dissertation, but
this hierarchy is restricted to specific layers of the system and uses only timeouts. e
leader election service of Schiper and Toueg uses inside information to suspect failures,
but the technique (tracking the presence of a process) is limited to a single component
of the system.
. Network monitoring
Manyworks in networkmonitoring [ , , , , , , , , ] complement the fail-
ure reporting services described in this dissertation. Broadly speaking, network moni-
toring systems extract intelligence from network elements to aid diagnosis, a technique
that failure reporting services could use to gather inside information from the network.
Indeed, Pigeon (Chapter ) borrows a network monitoring technique from Shaikh et
al. [ , ]. However, the goal of network monitoring is to help network operators per-
form diagnoses, while this dissertation aims to better inform distributed sysems about
failures.
Providing a comprehensive service to distributed applications, using global in-
formation about the state of a network, is the goal of information planes [ , ]. Works
in this area include the Knowledge Plane [ ], Sophia [ , ] (which provides a dis-
tributed computational model for queries), iPlane [ , ] (which helps end-host appli-
cations choose servers, peers, or relays, based on link latency, link loss, link capacity,
etc.), and NetQuery [ ] (which instantiates a Knowledge Plane under adversarial as-
sumptions). ese works are more flexible than the failure monitoring services in this
dissertation (they usually expose an interface to arbitrary queries), while our goal is
more focused: we aim to report failures to applications, a capability that these papers
do not discuss.
More targeted works include Meridian [ ] (a node and path selection ser-
vice), King [ ] (a latency estimation service), and Network Exception Handlers [ ]
(which delivers information from the network so end-hosts can participate in traffic en-
gineering). Again, the goals of these systems are not that of this dissertation (informing
applications about failures), and our work could be extended to use their techniques.
In fact, our systems propagate inside information similar to the delivery mechanism in
Network Exception Handlers.
While there are works that do report network failures and errors to end-hosts [ ,
, ], they do not provide a comprehensive abstraction, in contrast to our goals. For
example, Packet Obituaries [ ] proposes that each dropped packet should generate a
report about where the packet was dropped. Packet Obituaries uses different semantics
for network failures (they are concerned with dropped packets in the Internet) and does
not have coverage for host failures.
An important related system is NetPilot [ ]. NetPilot aims to automate the
network administrator’s task of handling failures using failure mitigation, which is a form
of . Specifically, when NetPilot suspects that a network device has failed, it
calculates the impact of deactivating that device and restarts the suspected device if
the impact is sufficiently low. NetPilot’s design is based on the fact that rebooting a
device is often the first step a network administrator takes and that this step is easy to
automate. NetPilot is complementary to this dissertation, though we note that Pigeon
(Chapter ) could be extended to take failure mitigation into account when estimating
the expected duration of a failure (see Section . ).
. Intersection of distributed systems and networking
Research that combines distributed systems and networking tends to apply distributed
systems techniques to make better networks, while this dissertation uses information
and mechanisms in the network to improve distributed systems. An exception to this
generalization is recent work on using data center networks to improve state machine
replication by making multicast more predictable [ ]. is work has a similar ethos to
Albatross (Chater ) and was completed concurrently.
Consistent networking aims to keep the network in a valid state at all times, under
configuration changes. For instance, consensus routing [ ] uses state machine replica-
tion to apply updates to BGP routers to avoid black holes and loops. More recent work
has examined primitives for consistent updates to OpenFlow [ ] networks to preserve
routing state [ ] and bandwidth guarantees [ ]. ese systems’ goals are distinct from
this dissertation’s: they aim to improve networks by reasoning about them as distributed
systems, whereas we seek to improve distributed systems by using inside information
from the network.
Fault-tolerant software-de ned networking. Traditional network infrastructure was
fault-tolerant because its routers and switches were physically distributed and its pro-
tocols were designed under extremely adverse assumptions [ ]. Software defined net-
working (SDN) centralizes the network’s routing logic into a controller. Some researchers
have used techniques from distributed systems to replicate and distribute the SDN
controller [ , , , , , ]. is work would complement Albatross (Chapter ),
which itself leverages SDN. Onix [ ] in particular would fit well with Albatross (pro-
vided Onix is configured to replicate a transactional and persistent state database across
controllers). HyperFlow [ ] also addresses distributed controllers; however, because
HyperFlow controllers can establish rules locally (without synchronizing with logically
centralized state), additional support is needed to integrate this work with Albatross.
DevoFlow [ ] relieves load on the controller by arranging for it to handle only “sig-
nificant” flows; this is consistent with the design of Albatross, since we expect failures
to be relatively rare and “significant” events. [ ] relieves controller load by
distributing the handling of events to authority switches, but this is orthogonal to Alba-
tross; the events that Albatross cares about are comparatively rare and can be handled
by a single controller.
Chapter
Falcon: using inside information for reliable failure detection
Two hunters are out in the woods when one of them collapses. He doesn’t seem to be
breathing and his eyes are glazed. e other guy whips out his phone and calls the emer-
gency services. He gasps, “My friend is dead! What can I do?” e operator says “Calm
down. I can help. First, let’s make sure he’s dead.” ere is a silence, then a gun shot is
heard. Back on the phone, the guy says “OK, now what?”
- LaughLab’s “World’s Funniest Joke” [ ]
Inside information promises fast reports of failures, but leveraging such in-
formation in a failure reporting service requires addressing three challenges: ( ) sys-
tematically collecting inside information, ( ) presenting that information coherently to
applications, and ( ) limiting negative impact. In this chapter, we first focus our atten-
tion on the second challenge by restricting the interface of a failure reporting service to
that of a reliable failure detector; this choice guides our design in addressing the remain-
ing two challenges. A reliable failure detector reports processes as “up” or “down”, with
the guarantee that any process reported as “down” has actually crashed; this guarantee
is inspired by Chandra and Toueg’s perfect failure detector [ ] (we purposefully avoid
calling anything implemented in this dissertation “perfect”).
Reliable failure detectors benefit applications by removing uncertainty about
failures. Since an application can trust “down” reports, it can avoid split-brain scenarios
is chapter revises [ ]: J. B. Leners, W.-L. Hung, H. Wu, M. K. Aguilera, and M. Walfish.
Detecting failures in distributed systems with the spy network, In , Oct. . Co-authors
Marcos K. Aguilera and Michael Walfish contributed to the presentation and design of Falcon. Wei-Lun
Hung and Hao Wu contributed to the implementation and evaluation of Falcon.
without using majority-based techniques such as Paxos [ ]. Instead, applications can
employ simpler techniques, like primary-backup [ ].
Building a reliable failure detector is not a new idea, and the standard approach is
to purposefully crash processes when they are suspected of failure [ , ]; this approach
is sometimes referred to as “shoot the other node in the head”, or for short.
e problem with is that it can cause collateral damage (e.g., halting a machine
to terminate a single suspected process).
In this chapter we present Falcon, a reliable failure detector that leverages inside
information to detect failures quickly and that kills surgically to avoid collateral dam-
age. Falcon uses a network of spies, which are layer-specific modules for determining
which components of a system are working. Spies sometimes kill components to back
up their decisions, but they can avoid collateral damage by surgically killing exactly the
component suspected of failure.
A challenge that we address in building Falcon is a careful, thorough, and general
design for spies to maximize coverage and limit unnecessary killing. Spies are deployed
in a chained network, where the spy in one layer monitors the spy at the next layer
up (e.g., the OS spy monitors the process spy). us, in the common case, if any layer
in the system crashes, some spy will observe it. ere are, however, two limiting cases
in Falcon. First, Falcon cannot assume that spies will detect every failure, so Falcon
includes a backstop: a large end-to-end timeout to cover (the ideally rare) cases that
spies miss. Second, to report “down” reliably, Falcon must be able to communicate
with some spy. e result is that if a network partition happens, Falcon hangs until
the network heals. We revisit the second case in Albatross (Chapter ) and Pigeon
(Chapter ), though we emphasize that these failure reporting services are not reliable
failure detectors.
We have implemented and evaluated Falcon. Our implementation deploys spies
on four layers: application, OS, hypervisor, and switch. We find that for a range of
failures, Falcon has sub-second detection time, which is one or two orders of magni-
tude faster than the end-to-end timeouts used by existing systems. is yields higher-
availability: adding Falcon to ZooKeeper [ ] (which provides configuration manage-
ment) and to a replication library [ ] reduces unavailability following some crashes by
roughly times. Falcon’s overheads and per-platform requirements are small, and it can
be integrated into an application with tens of lines of code. Finally, Falcon realizes the
benefits of accurate failure reporting: applications can shed complex logic for handling
inaccuracies from the failure reporting service (e.g., a replicated state machine can be
implemented with primary-backup [ ] instead of Paxos [ ]), thereby using roughly
half the code in our estimate.
. Design principles of Falcon
e design principles underlying Falcon are as follows:
Give reliable reports. With a reliable failure detector, applications that use Falcon
need not handle failure detector mistakes and the resulting complexity.
Peek inside the layers. Inside information can reveal crashes accurately and quickly.
For example, a process absent from the OS’s process table is certainly dead and a process
lacking some key thread is as good as dead. Extracting this information requires layer-
specific modules, which we call spies. Spies may sometimes use timeouts on internal
events (e.g., an event loop has not progressed for one second), but these timeouts can
be tailored to more predictable local behavior.
Kill surgically, if needed. A spy may not always observe failures correctly, but its
reports must be reliable. us, it may kill when it suspects a crash (e.g., a local time-
out has fired). Killing is disruptive and so should be limited to the smallest necessary
component, rather than entire machines [ , , ]. Such surgical killing conserves
resources (e.g., a single processes is killed while others on the same machine are not)
and improves recovery time (restarting a process is faster than restarting a machine).
A similar argument was made by Candea et al. [ , ] in the context of reboot.
Watch the watchers. Spies themselves may crash, either along with their layer, or
independently. is calls for a spy network, in which lower-level spies monitor higher-
level ones.


























Figure . : Architecture of Falcon. e application spy provides accurate information
about whether the application is up; this spy is the only one that can observe that the
application is working. e next spy down provides accurate information not only about
its layer but also about whether the application spy is up; more generally, lower-level
spies monitor higher-level ones.
Use end-to-end timeouts a last resort. As noted in Chapter , end-to-end timeouts
have problems, but they also have the useful property of completeness: end-to-end time-
outs eventually catch all failures. e completeness property makes end-to-end time-
outs useful as a catch-all for detecting failures unforeseen in the failure reporting ser-
vice’s design, even if they are sub-optimal for quickly detecting common case failures.
. Design of Falcon
Figure . depicts Falcon’s architecture. Falcon consists of a client library as well as sev-
eral spy modules (or spies) deployed at various layers of the system. e client library
provides the reliable failure detector interface to the client, and it coordinates the spies.
Roughly speaking, the client library takes as input the identifier of a target process, which
specifies a process whose operational status the client would like to know, and returns
function description
init(target) register with spies
uninit() deregister with spies
query() query the operational status
setCallback(callback) install callback function
clearCallback() cancel callback function
startTimer(timeout) start end-to-end timeout timer
stopTimer() stop end-to-end timeout timer
Figure . : Falcon’s reliable failure detector interface to clients.
“up” or “down”. A spy is a layer-specific monitor, and spies are named by the layer mon-
itored (e.g., the OS spy monitors the OS) but may have parts running at several layers.
e layers monitored by our current implementation are application, OS, hypervisor,
and network. Falcon assumes that lower layers enclose higher ones, i.e., whenever a
lower layer crashes, the layers above it also crash or stop responding. As an example, if
the hypervisor crashes, then both the OS and application crash; as another example, if
the network crashes, then the higher layers become unresponsive.
e difficulty in designing Falcon is using the knowledge and placement of spies
to meet the desired properties. Our experience is that ad-hoc approaches lead to erro-
neous designs or fail to satisfactorily address the three challenges in Chapter . We
present the design of Falcon by explaining, in turn, how we define the reliable failure
detector interface, determine the interface to spies, specify exactly what spies do, or-
chestrate spies, and handle various corner cases. Section . describes the details of the
spies in our implementation.
. . Reliable failure detector interface
e reliable failure detector interface that Falcon presents to clients is shown in Fig-
ure . . Function init() indicates the target to be monitored, which identifies each layer
(process name, VM id, hypervisor IP address, switch IP address). Function query() re-
turns “up” or “down” for the target. However, a client may wish to monitor the target
continuously while waiting for a response or another event. us, rather than invoking
query() repeatedly, it may be more efficient for the client to use a callback interface. To
that end, function setCallback() installs a callback function to be called when the status
of a target process changes from “up” to “down”. Function clearCallback() uninstalls the
callback function. To support end-to-end timeouts, Falcon needs to know when to start
and stop the timeout timer, which the client indicates by calling functions startTimer()
and stopTimer().
. . Objective and operation of spies
A given layer is supposed to perform some activity, and if the layer is performing it,
then the layer is alive by definition. In a web server, activity may mean serving HTTP
requests; for a map-reduce task, activity may mean reading and processing from disk;
for a numerical application, activity may mean finishing a small stage of the compu-
tation; for a generic server, it may mean placing requests on an internal work queue
and waiting for a response; for the OS, it may mean scheduling a ready-to-run process;
and for a hypervisor, it may mean scheduling virtual machines and executing internal
functions.
e purpose of a spy is to sense the presence or absence of such activity using
this inside information. A spy exposes three remote procedures:
• () to register a remote callback (which is distinct from the callback to the
client in § . . : the one here goes from a spy to the client library);
• () to cancel it; and
• () to kill the monitored layer.
If the layer that the spy is monitoring crashes, the spy immediately calls back
the client library, reporting .
A spy is designed to recognize the common case when the monitored layer is
clearly crashed or healthy. What if the spy is uncertain? To support reliable failure de-
tection, a report of must be true, always. us, if the spy is inclined to report
but is not sure, the spy resorts to killing: it terminates the layer that it is moni-
toring and then reports . (Section . explains how spies at each layer kill reliably;
remote-procedure ()
add caller to Clients
return
remote-procedure ()
remove caller from Clients
return
remote-procedure ()




sense layer and set rc accordingly
if rc = _ then
callback( _ )




for each client ∈ Clients do
send status to client
Figure . : Pseudocode for spies.
the basic idea is to use a component embedded in the layer below the layer to be killed.)
Of course, spies should be designed to avoid killing.
Figure . gives pseudocode for our spies. Below, in Section . . , we describe
how the client library coordinates the spies, assuming that ( ) spies are ideal and ( )
network partitions do not happen. Sections . . and . . relax these two assumptions
in turn.
. . Orchestration: watching the watchmen
To report the operational status of the target, the client library uses the following al-
gorithm. On initialization, it registers callbacks with each spy at the target and sets a
local status variable to “up”. If the client library receives a callback from any of
the spies, it sets the status variable to “down”. When the client library receives a query
tag error / limiting case cause effect
A layer L is down, but spy on layer L thinks
layer L is up
bug in layer-L spy triggers end-to-end timeout
B layer L is down but spy on layer L is unre-
sponsive
bug in layer-L spy triggers end-to-end timeout
C layer L is up, but spy on layer L or below
reports
should not happen would compromise guarantees
D none of the spies responds network partition Falcon hangs or watchdog activates
Figure . : Errors and limiting cases in Falcon, and their effects.
from the application, it returns the value of the status variable.
To see why this algorithm works, first note that if the target application is re-
sponsive then none of the spies returns —we are assuming ideal spies—and there-
fore the client library reports the status of the target correctly. If the target application
crashes but the application spy remains alive, then the application spy returns
and subsequently the client library reports the status of the target correctly. However,
the application spy may never return, because it might have crashed. In that case, we
rely on the spy at the next level—the OS spy—to sense this problem: in fact, the role
of the layer-L spy can be seen as monitoring the layer-(L + 1) spy, as shown in Fig-
ure . . Here, the OS spy is monitoring the application spy, and if the application spy
is crashed, the OS spy will eventually return —provided the OS spy itself is alive.
If the OS spy is not alive, this procedure continues at the spy at the next level, and so
on. e ultimate result is that if a spy never responds, a lower-level spy will sense the
unresponsive spy and will report , causing the client library to report “down” to
the client.
We have not yet said how the spy on layer L+ 1 is monitored by the spy on layer
L. e spy on layer L + 1 has a component at layer L, for killing and for responding to
queries. Given this component, the spy on layer L can monitor the spy on layer L+1 by
monitoring layer L itself. is avoids the complexity of a signaling protocol among spies.
It works because, assuming ideal spies, the spy on layer L + 1 is down (permanently
unresponsive) if and only if layer L is down.
. . Coping with imperfect spies
e last section assumed ideal spies. In this section, we identify the types of mistakes
that a spy can make and explain how Falcon deals with these mistakes. While Falcon
may take drastic actions (killing or waiting for a long time), we expect them to be rare.
ere are four types of spy errors that we consider, as shown in Figure . . Error
A takes place when a spy does not recognize a rare failure condition and thus wrongly
thinks that a layer is up; for instance, an OS spy thinks that the OS is up because it
shows some signs of life, yet the OS has stopped scheduling processes. Error B happens
when there is a violation in the assumption from Section . . that a layer L is up if
and only if the spy on layer L + 1 is responsive. Error C occurs if a spy reports
when either the monitored layer is up or any spy above the monitored layer is up. Error
D occurs when none of the spies responds, because of a network problem such as a
partition.
Errors A and B cause the query function to always return “up” despite the ap-
plication’s being down. To address this problem, Falcon has a backstop: an end-to-end
timeout started by the client. If this end-to-end timeout expires, Falcon kills the highest
layer that it can and subsequently reports the target as “down”.
Error C is outside of the scope of Falcon because Falcon is expressly designed
not to have this error: when a spy reports , it must absolutely ensure that the
layer is down: forever disconnected from the outside world. Error D requires a more
in-depth treatment, which we give in Section . . .
Figure . describes the client library’s pseudocode. ere are several points to
note here. First, end-to-end timeouts are used to indicate a failure only in the unlikely
case that none of the spies can determine that a layer is up or down. Second, each spy’s
kill procedure is invoked by the client library when the end-to-end timeout expires.
is procedure attempts to kill the highest layer and, if not successful after
, targets each lower layer successively. In this manner, killing is surgical. A
reasonable value for is seconds; this parameter affects detection
time (by imposing a floor) but only when a large end-to-end timeout expires, an event
that we expect to be rare.
function init(target)
for L← 1 to N do





for L← 1 to N do








start countdown timer with value timeout
function stopTimer()
stop countdown timer
upon receiving callback (status) from spy in Target[L] do
if status = then
Status← “down”
Callback(“down” )
upon expiration of countdown timer do
for L← N downto 1 do
invoke () at spy in Target[L]
if L /= 1 then wait for reply for _ _
else wait for reply // blocks on network partition; see § . . .




Figure . : Pseudocode for the client library. N is the number of monitored layers and
the layer number of the application.
. . Network partition
We said above that lower-level spies monitor higher-level ones, but no spy monitors
the lowest level spy. is is not a problem because that spy inspects the network switch
attached to the target so it is conceptually a spy on the target’s network connectivity.
us, if the client library does not hear from that spy, then the network is slow or
partitioned. (Our current implementation assumes that a machine is attached to one
switch; we discuss the case of multiple switches in Section . .)
ere are three ways to handle network partition in Falcon. First, the client
library can block until it hears from the switch; this is what our implementation does.
Second, the client library can, after the client-supplied timeout expires call back with “I
don’t know”; this is an implementation convenience conceptually identical to blocking.
ird, the client library can report “down” after it is sure that a watchdog timer on the
switch has disconnected the target; meanwhile, in ordinary operation, the watchdog is
serviced by heartbeats from the client library to the switch.
. . Application restart
If the application crashes or exits, and restarts, the client library should not report the
application as “up” because clients typically want to know about the restart (e.g., the
application may have lost part of its state in a crash). erefore, when the application
restarts, Falcon treats it as a different instance to be monitored, and the original crashed
instance is reported “down”.
To implement the above, the spy on a layer labels the layer with a generation
number, and the spy includes this number in messages to the client library. Upon ini-
tialization, the client library records each layer’s generation number. If it receives a
mismatched generation number from a spy, then the associated layer has restarted and
the client library considers the monitored instance as down. (Generation numbers are
omitted from the pseudocode for brevity.)
Implementing generation numbers carries a subtlety: the generation number of
a layer needs to increase if any layer below it restarts. us, a spy at layer L constructs
its generation number as follows. It takes the entire generation number of layer L − 1,
inspector
enforcer







Figure . : Architecture of spies. A spy has two components: an inspector that gathers
inside information and an enforcer that ensures the reliability of reports (and may
also use inside information). e client library communicates with the enforcer.
left shifts it bits, and sets the low-order bits to a counter that it increments on
every restart. ( e base case is the generation number of the lowest layer, which is just a
counter.) At the application level, therefore, the generation number is a concatenation
of -bit counters, one for each layer. bits are sufficient because a problem occurs
only if (a) the counter wraps around very quickly as crashes occur rapidly, and (b) the
counter suddenly stops exactly where it was the last time that the client library checked.
. Details of Falcon’s spies
e previous section described Falcon’s high-level design. is section gives details of
four classes of spies that we have built: application spies, an OS spy, a hypervisor spy,
and a network connectivity spy. We emphasize that these spies are illustrative refer-
ence designs, not the final word; one can extend spies based on design-time application
knowledge or on failures observed in a given system. Nevertheless, the spies that we
present should serve as an existence proof that it is possible to react to a large class of
failures.
As shown in Figure . , a spy has two components:
. Inspector: is component is embedded in the monitored layer and gathers detailed
inside information to infer the operational status, for example by inspecting the
appropriate data structures.
. Enforcer: is component communicates with the client library and is responsible
for killing the monitored layer; for these reasons, it resides one layer below the
monitored layer. is component may also use inside information.
A spy has only two technical requirements (§ . . ): it must eventually detect
crashes of the layer that it is monitoring (and even then, Falcon handles the case that
the spy fails in this charge, per § . . ), and it must be reliable, meaning that its
answers are accurate. However, in practice, a spy should be more ambitious: it should
provide guarantees that are broader than the letter of its contract implies. To explain
these guarantees and how they are achieved, we answer the questions below for each
spy in our implementation, which is depicted in Figure . .
• What are the spy’s components, and how do they communicate? ere is a lot of latitude
here, but we discuss in Section . the possibility of a uniform intra-spy interface.
• How does the spy detect crashes with sub-second detection time?Detecting failures quickly
is the high-level goal of Falcon (and this dissertation more generally), so Falcon’s
spies should detect failures quickly locally.
• How does the spy avoid false suspicions of crashes and the resulting needless kills? Avoiding
false suspicion is not an explicit requirement of a spy, but it is far better if the
resulting needless kills are kept to a minimum to limit the negative impact of Falcon.
• How does the spy give a reliable answer? Giving a reliable answer requires two abilities
from spies. First, spies must be able to determine with certainty when their layer is
down. Second, spies must be able to kill a layer when they are uncertain of its status
(or requested to kill via ).
• What are the implementation details of the spy? Spies are unavoidably platform-specific,
and we try to give a flavor of that specificity as we describe the implementation
details. Section . discusses how Falcon might work with a different set of layers






















Figure . : Our implementation of Falcon.
layer (e.g., Windows instead of Linux).
Application spies. All of our application spies have a common organization and ap-
proach.
Components. e inspector is a dedicated thread inside the application; it calls
a function getStatus(), whose implementation depends on the application. For exam-
ple, in our primary-backup application spy, getStatus() checks whether the main event
loop is processing events; in our ZooKeeper [ ] spy, getStatus() tests whether a client
request has been recently processed, while a separate component submits no-op client
requests at a low rate.
e enforcer is a distinguished high-priority process, the app enforcer, which
serves as the enforcer for all monitored applications on the same OS. An assumption is
that if the OS is up, then so is the app enforcer; this is an instance of the assumption,
from Section . . , that “if layer-L is up, then so is the spy on layer-(L+1)”. As discussed
in Section . . , in the uncommon case that this assumption is violated, Falcon Falcon
relies on an end-to-end timeout. e enforcer communicates with each inspector over
a connected inter-process communication (IPC) channel.
Sub-second detection time. If the inspector locally detects a problem, it closes its
handle to the connected IPC channel, causing the enforcer to suspect a crash immedi-
ately (which it then handles per Reliability, below). Similarly, if the application process
exits or crashes, then it brings the inspector down with it, again causing an immediate
notification along IPC.
In addition, every Tapp-check time units, the enforcer queries the inspector thread,
which invokes getStatus(). e enforcer infers a crash if getStatus() returns “down”, if
the IPC handle returns an error, or if the inspector thread does not respond within an
application specific Tapp-resp time; the enforcer again handles these cases per Reliability,
below. We note that getStatus() can use timing considerations apart from Tapp-resp and
Tapp-check to return “down” (e.g., the inspector might know that if a given request is not
removed from an internal queue within ms, then the application is effectively down).
e periodic queries from enforcer to inspector achieve sub-second detection
time in the usual cases because our implementation sets Tapp-check to ms. While the
precise choice is arbitrary, the order of magnitude (tens or hundreds of milliseconds)
is not. Checking does not involve the network, and it is inexpensive—less than . %
overhead per check in our experiments (see Figure . , Section . . and divide
by to scale per check). at is, we accept a minimal processing cost to get rapid
detection time in the usual cases. e remaining case is covered by Tapp-resp, which our
implementation sets to ms of time, yielding sub-second detection time under
light to medium load.
Avoiding false suspicions. e application spy avoids false suspicion in two ways.
First, as mentioned above, the enforcer measures Tapp-resp by the time consumed
by the monitored application, not real time; this is an example of inside information
and avoids the case that the enforcer declares an unresponsive application down when
in fact the application is temporarily slow because of load. We note that this approach
does not undermine any real-time deadlines since those are expressed and enforced by
Falcon’s end-to-end timeout (§ . . ).
A second use of inside information is that Tapp-resp is set by the application itself.
One choice is Tapp-resp = ∞; in that case, if the app inspector is unresponsive, Falcon
relies on the end-to-end timeout. Or, an application might expect to be able to reply
quickly, if it is scheduled and given cycles, in which case it can set a smaller value
of Tapp-resp for faster detection when the application process is unexpectedly stuck.
Reliability. If the enforcer suspects a crash, it inspects the process table. If the
application process is not there, the enforcer no longer has doubt and reports
to the client library. On the other hand, if the process is in the process table, then the
enforcer kills it (by asking the OS to do so) and waits for confirmation (by polling
the process table every ms) before reporting . If the process does not leave the
process table, then Falcon relies on the end-to-end timeout.
Implementation details. e inspector and app enforcer run on Linux and we
assign app enforcer the maximum real-time priority. We also lock the processes address
space in memory (to prevent its being swapped out). e inspector is implemented in a
library; using the library requires only supplying getStatus() and a value of Tapp-resp. e
IPC channel between inspector and app enforcer is a Unix domain socket. e enforcer
kills by sending a . We are assuming that process ids are not recycled during the
(short) process table polling interval; if a process id is recycled, the end-to-end timeout
applies.
OS spy. Our OS spy currently assumes virtualization; Section . discusses how Fal-
con could handle alternate layerings.
Components. e inspector consists of (a) a kernel module that, when invoked,
increments a counter in the OS’s address space and (b) a high-priority process, the
incrementer, that invokes this kernel module every TOS-inc time units, set to ms in our
implementation. e enforcer is a module inside the hypervisor. e communication
between the enforcer and the inspector is implicit: the enforcer infers that there was a
crash if the counter is not incremented. Before detailing this process, we briefly consider
an alternate OS spy: the enforcer could inspect a kernel counter like jiffies, instead of
a process-incremented counter. We rejected this approach because an observation of
increasing jiffies does not imply a functional OS. With our approach, in contrast, if
the counter is increasing the enforcer knows that at least the high priority incrementer
process is being scheduled. e cost of this higher-level assurance is an extra point of
failure: if the incrementer crashes (which is unlikely), then Falcon treats it as an OS
crash. Specifically, the OS enforcer would detect the absence of increments, kill, and
report .
Sub-second detection time. Every TOS-check time units, the enforcer checks the OS.
To do so, it first checks whether the VMof theOS is running. If not, the enforcer reports
to the client library. Otherwise, it checks whether the counter has incremented
at least once over an interval of TOS-resp time units, and if the counter is the same, the
enforcer suspects that the OS (or virtual machine) has crashed, which it handles per
Reliability below. is approach achieves sub-second detection time by choosing TOS-check
and TOS-resp to be tens or hundreds of milliseconds; our implementation sets them to
ms.
Avoiding false suspicions. Given the detection mechanism above, a false suspicion
happens when the counter is not incremented, yet the VM is up. is case is most
likely caused by temporary slowness of the VM, which in turn results from load on the
whole machine. To ensure that the OS spy does not wrongly declare failure in such
situations, we carefully choose TOS-inc, TOS-check, and TOS-resp to avoid premature local
timeouts most of the time, even in extreme cases. is approach is inexact, as the VM
could in theory slow down arbitrarily—say, due to a flood of hardware interrupts—
triggering a premature local timeout. However, we do not expect this case to happen
frequently; if it happens, the enforcer will kill the OS, but the spy will not return
incorrect information.
We validate our choice of parameters by running a fork exec bomb inside a
guest OS, observing that in a minute period ( , checks) the enforcer sees, per
check, a mean of . increments, with a standard deviation of . , and a minimum of
(where one increment satisfies the enforcer). Of course, the operators of a production
deployment would have to validate the parameters more extensively, using an actual
peak workload. We note that these kinds of local timing parameters have to be validated
only once and are likely to be accurate; this is an example of inside information and does
not have the disadvantages of end-to-end timeouts.
Reliability. If the VM is no longer being scheduled, the enforcer can verify that
case, using its access to the hypervisor. If the enforcer suspects a crash, it asks the
hypervisor to stop scheduling the VM and waits for confirmation.
Implementation details. Like the app enforcer, the incrementer is a Linux pro-
cess to which we assign the maximum real-time priority and which we also lock into
memory. Our hypervisor is standard Linux; the VMs are QEMU/KVM [ ] instances.
e enforcer runs alongside these instances and communicates with them through the
libvirtd daemon, which exposes the libvirt API, an interface to common virtualization
functions [ ]. We extend this API with a call to check the incrementer’s activity. Since
all calls into the libvirt API are blocking, we split the OS enforcer into two types of
processes. A singleton main process communicates with the client library and forks a
worker process, one per VM, sharing a pipe with the worker process. e workers use
the libvirt API to examine the guests’ virtual memory, kill guest VMs, and confirm
kills.
Hypervisor spy. Our implementation assumes the ability to deploy new functionality
on the switch. We believe this assumption to be reasonable in our target environment
(data center networks; Chapter ), particularly given the trend toward programmable
switches. We also assume that the target is connected to the network through a single
interface; Section . discusses how this assumption could be relaxed.
Components. e inspector is a module in the hypervisor, while the enforcer is a
software module that runs on the switch to which the hypervisor host is attached. e
enforcer infers that the hypervisor is crashed if (a) the switch has not seen any traffic
from the hypervisor for a period of time and (b) the enforcer cannot solicit traffic by
pinging the inspector (this detection method saves network bandwidth, versus more
active pinging). e two communicate by RPC over UDP.
Sub-second detection time. Every Thypervisor-check time units, the enforcer checks that
the hypervisor is alive. is check takes one of two forms. Usually, the enforcer checks
whether the switch has received network packets from the hypervisor over the prior
interval. If this check fails or if an interval of Thypervisor-check- time units (set to seconds
in our implementation) has passed since the last probe, the enforcer probes the inspector
with an RPC. If it does not get a response within Thypervisor-resp time units (set to ms in
our implementation), it does Nhypervisor-retry more tries (set to in our implementation),
for a total waiting period of Thypervisor-resp ⋅ (Nhypervisor-retry + 1) time units ( ms in our
implementation). After this period, the enforcer suspects a crash and handles that case
per Reliability, below. Similar to the other spies, this one achieves sub-second detection
time by choice of Thypervisor-check: ms in our implementation.
Avoiding false suspicions. First, our enforcer test is conservative: most of the
time, any traffic from the hypervisor host placates the enforcer. Second, we validate
our choice of parameters by running an experiment where processes on the hy-
pervisor contend for . We set the enforcer to query the inspector , times,
observing a mean response time of µs, with standard deviation of µs, and a max-
imum of . ms, which suffices to satisfy the enforcer. As with the OS spy, operators
would need to do more extensive parameter validation for production. Finally, although
Nhypervisor-retry is a constant in our implementation, a better implementation would set
Nhypervisor-retry in proportion to the traffic into the hypervisor. en the test would permit
more retransmissions under higher load, accommodating a message’s lower likelihood
of getting through.
Reliability. If it suspects a crash, the enforcer “kills” the hypervisor, by shutting
down the network port to which the hypervisor is connected. e enforcer then reports
to the client library. Here, Falcon assumes that every process running on every
VM running on that end-host is shut down before that end-host is allowed to reconnect.
Implementation details. e hypervisor inspector runs as a process on the hypervi-
sor (which is standard Linux, as described above). e hypervisor enforcer is a daemon
process that we run on the open router platform [ ], which we modified to
map connected hosts to physical ports and to run our software.
Network spy. e inspector is a software module that runs on the network switch
connected to the target, and the enforcer is a module in the client library. However,
under our current configuration and implementation of Falcon, the network spy does
not check for failures and does not affect Falcon’s end-to-end behavior or our experi-
mental results. e reason is that Falcon’s knowledge of the network is limited to the
switch attached to the target, so Falcon has no way to (a) know whether the switch is
crashed or just slow, and (b) kill the switch if it is in doubt. e consequence is that Fal-
con blocks when the switch is unresponsive. We revisit this choice in Chapters and .
. Evaluation of Falcon
We evaluate our implementation of Falcon by considering challenges of building a fast
failure reporting service set forth in Chapter —systematically collecting inside infor-
mation, coherently presenting that information to applications, and limiting the nega-
tive impact of deployment—and asking to what degree Falcon meets those challenges.
We also evaluate higher-level benefits for the applications that are clients of Falcon.
To do so, we experiment with Falcon, other failure detectors [ , , ], ZooKeeper,
ZooKeeper modified to use Falcon, a minimal Paxos-based replication library [ ], that
library modified to use Falcon, and a primary-backup-based replication library that uses
Falcon. Figure . summarizes our evaluation results.
Most of our experiments involve two panels. e first is a failure panel with
kinds of model failures that we inject to evaluate Falcon’s ability to detect them (the
kernel failures are from a kernel test module [ ]). e second is a transient condition
panel with seven kinds of imposed load conditions, which are not failures, to evaluate
Falcon’s ability to avoid false suspicions. e failure panel is listed in Figure . , and
the transient condition panel is detailed in Section . . . Since the panels are synthetic,
our evaluation should be viewed as an initial validation of Falcon, one within the means
of academic research. An extended validation requires deploying Falcon in production
environments and exposing it to failures “in the wild.”
Our testbed comprises three hosts connected to a switch. e switch is an ASUS
RT N . e software on the switch is the v -sp [ ] platform (essentially
Linux), extended with our hypervisor enforcer (§ . ). Our hosts are Dell PowerEdge
T , each with a quad-core Intel Xeon . GHz processor, GB of RAM, and two
Gigabit Ethernet ports. Each host runs an OS natively that serves as a hypervisor.
e native (host) OS is -bit Linux ( . . -gentoo-r ), compiled with the kvm mod-
ule [ ], running QEMU (v . . ) and a modified libvirt [ ] (v . . ). e virtual
machines (guests) run -bit Linux ( . . -gentoo-r ), extended with a kernel module
and accompanying kernel patch (for the OS inspector).
high-level question evaluation result section
• Even simple spies are powerful enough to detect a range of
common failures.
§ . .
What is the effect of
Falcon’s spy network?
• For these failure modes, Falcon’s th percentile detection
time is several hundred ms; existing failure detectors take
one or two orders of magnitude longer.
§ . .
• Augmenting ZooKeeper [ ] and a replication library
(PMP) [ ] with Falcon (minus killing) reduces unavailabil-
ity by roughly times (or more, for PMP) for crashes below
application level.
§ . .
What is the effect of the
reliable failure detector
interface?
• As a reliable failure detector, Falcon enables primary-
backup replication [ ], which requires fewer processes than
Paxos [ ] for the same fault-tolerance, and which requires
less complexity ( % less code in our comparison).
§ . .
• For a range of failures, Falcon kills the smallest problematic
component that it can.
§ . .
• Falcon avoids false suspicions (and kills) even when the tar-
get is unresponsive end-to-end.
§ . .
How does Falcon limit
negative impact?
• Falcon’s costs at each layer are single digits (or less) of
percentage overhead.
§ . .
• Falcon requires per-platform code: about lines in our
implementation. However, the added code is likely simpler
than the application logic that can be removed by using an
reliable failure detector.
§ . .
• Falcon can be introduced into an application with tens or
hundreds of lines of code.
§ . . ,
§ . .
Figure . : Summary of main evaluation results.
where injected? what is the failure? what does the failure model?
application forced crash application memory error, assert failure, or con-
dition that causes exit




unresponsive app inspector since the app inspector is a thread inside the ap-
plication, this models a buggy application (or
app inspector) that cannot run but has not ex-
ited
kernel infinite loop kernel hang or liveness problem
kernel stack overflow runaway kernel code
kernel kernel panic unexpected condition that causes assert failure
in kernel
hypervisor/host hypervisor error; causes guest
termination
hypervisor memory error, assert failure, or con-
dition that causes guest exit
hypervisor/host disable network card on host hardware crash that separates hypervisor from
network
Falcon itself crash of app enforcer bug in Falcon app spy
Falcon itself crash of incrementer bug in Falcon OS spy
Falcon itself crash of OS enforcer bug in Falcon OS spy
Falcon itself crash of hypervisor inspector bug in Falcon hypervisor spy
Figure . : Panel of synthetic failures in our evaluation. e failures are at multiple
layers of the stack and model various error conditions.
. . How fast is Falcon?
Method. We compare Falcon to a set of baseline failure detectors (FDs), focusing on
detection times under the failure panel.
Figure . describes the baselines. ese FDs are used in production or de-
ployed systems (the ϕ-accrual FD is used by the Cassandra key-value store [ ], static
timers are used in many systems, etc.); we borrow the code to implement them from
a Google Summer of Code project [ ]. All of these FDs work as follows: the client
pings the target according to a fixed ping interval parameter p, and if the client has not
heard a response by a deadline, the client declares a failure. We define the timeout T to
be the duration from when the last ping was received until the deadline for the follow-
ing ping. e difference in these FDs is in the algorithm that adjusts the timeout or
baseline FD T: timeout (ms) error parameters
Static Timer 10,000 0.0 timer = 10,000
Chen [ ] 5,001 0.0 α = 1 ms
Bertier [ ] 5,020 0.0 β = 1, ϕ = 4, γ = 0.1, mod_step = 0
ϕ-accrual [ ] 4,946 0.01 ϕ = 0.4297
ϕ-accrual 4,995 0.001 ϕ = 0.4339
Figure . : Baseline failure detectors that we compare to Falcon. e implementations
are from [ ].We set their ping intervals as p = 5 seconds, which is aggressive and favors
the baseline FDs. For all but Static Timer, the timeout value T is a function of network
characteristics and various parameters, which we set to make the error, e, small (e is
the fraction of ping intervals for which the FD declares a premature timeout). We set
ϕ-accrual for different e; in our experiments with no network delay, Chen and Bertier
have no observable error.
deadline (based on empirical round-trip delay and/or on configured error tolerance).
We configure the baselines with p = 5 seconds, which is pessimistic for Falcon, as
this setting allows the baselines to detect failures more quickly than they would in data
center applications, where ping intervals are tens of seconds [ , , ]. Likewise, we
configure the ϕ-accrual failure detector to allow many more premature timeouts (one
out of every and ping intervals) than would be standard in a real deployment,
which also decreases its timeout and hence its detection time.
We configure Falcon with an end-to-end timeout of minutes; Falcon can afford
this large backstop because it detects common failures much faster. For a like-to-like
comparison between the baselines (which are unreliable) and Falcon (which is reliable),
we also experiment with an unreliable version of Falcon called Falcon-NoKill, which is
identical to Falcon except that it does not kill.
Each experiment holds constant the FD and the failure from the panel, and
has iterations. In each iteration, we choose the failure time uniformly at random
inside an FD’s periodic monitoring interval of duration p (for the baselines, p is the ping
interval and for Falcon it is ms, per § . ). To produce a failure, a failure generator
running at the FD client sends an RPC to one of the failure servers that we deploy at
different layers on the target.
For convenience, our experiments measure detection time at the FD client, as











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the elapsed time from when the client sends the RPC to the failure server to when the
FD declares the failure. is approach adds one-way network delay to the measure-
ment. However, we verified through separate experiments with synchronized clocks
that the added delay is – orders of magnitude smaller than the detection times.
Experiments and results. We measure the detection times of the baseline FDs and
of Falcon-NoKill, for a range of failures. Under constant network delay, we expect the
baseline FDs’ detection times to be uniformly distributed over [T−p+d,T+d]; here, T
and p are the timeout and ping interval, as defined above and quantified in Figure . ,
and d is the one-way network delay. We hypothesize that Falcon’s detection times will
be on the order of ms, given spies’ periodic checks (§ . ).
Figure . depicts the st, th, and th percentile detection times, under no
network delay (d = 0). e baselines behave as expected. For application crashes, Fal-
con’s median detection time is larger than we had expected: ms. e cause is the
time taken by the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) to shut down, which we verified to be
several hundred milliseconds on average. For the failure in which the app inspector
reports , Falcon’s median detection time is . ms. is is in line with expecta-
tions: the app enforcer polls the app inspector every Tapp-check = 100 ms, so we expect an
average detection time of ms plus processing delays.
For the kernel hang, kernel overflow, and kernel panic failures, Falcon’s median
detection times are ms, ms, and ms, respectively. e expected value here is
ms plus processing delays: every TOS-check = 100 ms, the OS enforcer checks whether
the prior interval saw OS activity (§ . ), so the OS enforcer in expectation has to wait
at least 50 ms (the duration from the failure until the end of the prior interval) plus
100 ms (the time until the OS enforcer sees no activity). e processing delays in our
unoptimized implementation are higher than we would like: ms per check, for a total
of ms per failure, plus tens of milliseconds from supporting libraries and the client.
e largest detection time occurs when the target fails just after replying to a ping; the client receives
the ping reply after d time and declares the failure at the next deadline after T time, for a detection time
of T + d. e smallest detection time occurs when the target fails just before replying to a ping; after d
time (when the ping reply would have arrived), the client waits for T − p time longer, then declares the
failure, for a detection time of T − p + d.
Nevertheless, these delays, plus the expected value of ms, explain the observations.
For the guest exit and host crash failures, Falcon’s median detection times are
ms and ms, respectively. For the guest exit, the observed detection time matches
an expected ms (since TOS-check = 100 ms) plus cleanup by the hypervisor of ms
plus processing delays of tens of milliseconds. Likewise, for the host crash, the observed
detection time matches an expected ms (since Thypervisor-check = 100 ms) plus the ms
of waiting (see § . ), plus processing delays.
Falcon’s detection time is an order of magnitude faster than that of the baseline
FDs, for two reasons. First, inside information reveals the crash soon after it happens;
second, the spies call back the client library when they detect a crash. With larger ping
intervals p (which would be more realistic), the baselines’ detection times would be
even worse.
Our depictedmeasurements, here and ahead, are under no network delay (roughly
modeling an uncongested network in a data center). However, we ran some of our ex-
periments under injected delays (d > 0) and found, as expected, that Falcon’s detection
time increased by d. We did not experiment with the baselines under network delay;
our prediction of their detection times (distributed over [T − p + d,T + d]) is stated
above. We did not experiment under non-constant delay; based on their algorithms,
we predict that the baselines, except for Static Timer, would react to network variation
by increasing their timeout T. Falcon, meanwhile, would continue to detect crashes
quickly, improving its relative performance.
. . What is Falcon’s effect on availability?
We now consider the effect of improved detection time on system availability. We in-
corporate Falcon into two applications that use failure detectors based on static timers
and majority-based techniques to handle FD errors: ZooKeeper [ ] and a replication
library [ ] (PMP). e modifications are straightforward: roughly lines of Java
and lines of C, respectively. We compare unavailability of these systems and their
unmodified versions, in the case of a leader crash.
To apply Falcon, we use the spy for ZooKeeper, as described in Section . (“Ap-





































Figure . : Median response gap (unavailability) of ZooKeeper [ ] with Falcon-
NoKill (F) and unmodified (Un) under injected failures at the leader. In unmodified
ZooKeeper, followers quickly detect application crashes but not kernel- or host/VMM-
level crashes. Under the latter types, Falcon reduces median ZooKeeper unavailability
by roughly a factor of . In all cases, unavailability is several seconds on top of detection
time because of ZooKeeper’s recovery time.
in both cases, we use Falcon-NoKill, as both systems’ unmodified failure detectors are
unreliable. e unmodified ZooKeeper detects a crashed leader either via a ten-second
timeout or if the leader’s host closes the transport session with the followers. e un-
modified PMP runs with its default of a ten-second timeout.
We configure ZooKeeper to use nodes: servers and client (our testbed has
hosts, so the client and a server run on the same hypervisor). ZooKeeper partitions
the servers into leader and followers. e ZooKeeper client sends requests to one of
the followers (alternating “create” and “delete” requests) when it gets a response to its
last one, recording the time of every response. For each of three failure types and the
two ZooKeepers, we perform runs. In each run, we inject a failure into the leader at
a time selected uniformly at random between and seconds after the run begins. e




 0  5  10  15
time (sec)
Figure . depicts the durations of those response gaps. Under application fail-
ures, ZooKeeper reacts relatively quickly because the follower explicitly loses its trans-
port session with the leader. ough the median of ZooKeeper Falcon is ms slower
than with unmodified ZooKeeper, this difference appears due to experimental variation
(ZooKeeper Falcon also experiences transport session loss, and the standard deviations
are ms for ZooKeeper Falcon and ms for unmodified ZooKeeper). Under ker-
nel and hypervisor/host failures, the ZooKeeper follower receives no word that the
system is leaderless, so it infers failure—and initiates leader election—only after not
having heard from the leader for seconds. Under all failures, Falcon’s detection time
is sub-second. However, unavailability is detection time plus recovery time, and in all
of the depicted cases, recovery takes roughly seconds: the ZooKeeper follower, in
connecting to the new leader, usually requires two attempts separated by one second,
and the client also has a retry discipline that imposes delays of one second or more.
We run analogous experiments for PMP, and the results are similar: tens of
seconds of unavailability without Falcon and less than one second with Falcon.
. . What is the impact of killing in Falcon?
We consider how Falcon limits its negative impact, beginning with the impact of killing,
which has two aspects: ( ) If Falcon must kill, it should kill the smallest possible com-
ponent, and ( ) Falcon should not kill if not required (e.g., if the target is momentarily
slow); that is, Falcon should avoid false suspicions. To evaluate these aspects, we run
Falcon against our two panels, failures and transient conditions, reporting the compo-
nent killed, if any. Figure . tabulates the results.
For aspect ( ), Falcon’s reactions to the injected failures match our expectations.
If the failure is in the target, Falcon detects it and, if needed, kills the smallest com-
ponent of the target. If, however, the failure is in Falcon itself (the last four injected
failures), then there are two cases: either Falcon falls back on the end-to-end timeout,
killing the layer at which the spy failure occurred, or else Falcon interprets the spy’s
failure as a layer failure and kills the layer quickly (e.g., as mentioned in Section . ,
Falcon treats an incrementer crash as an OS crash). Falcon’s surgical approach to relia-
bility should be contrasted with , which kills the entire machine (though some
failure action taken by Falcon
app crash app enforcer detects failure
app layer-down report app enforcer kills application
app inspector hangs app enforcer kills application
kernel hang OS enforcer kills guest OS
kernel stack overflow OS enforcer kills guest OS
kernel panic OS enforcer kills guest OS
hypervisor error / guest exit OS enforcer detects failure
host down hypervisor enforcer kills hypervisor/host
crashed app enforcer app crash end-to-end timeout kills guest OS
crashed incrementer OS enforcer kills guest OS
crashed OS enforcer OS crash end-to-end timeout kills hypervisor/host
crashed hypervisor inspector hypervisor enforcer kills hypervisor/host
transient condition action taken by Falcon
hung system call none
contention within guest none
contention across guests none
memory contention within guest none
memory contention across guests OS enforcer kills guest OS
packet flood between guests none
packet flood between hypervisor hypervisor enforcer kills hypervisor/host
Figure . : Falcon’s actions under the failure panel and transient condition panel.
(Falcon-specific failures are augmented with target failures because otherwise the Fal-
con failure has no effect.) Under the failures, Falcon kills surgically. Under the transient
conditions, Falcon correctly holds its fire in most cases but sometimes suspects falsely
and thus kills.
implementations can target virtual machines [ ]).
To show that Falcon avoids spurious killing, we apply the panel of transient
conditions, listed in the bottom part of Figure . . We expected Falcon to hold its fire
in all of these cases, but there are two for which it does not. First, when guests contend
for memory, the hypervisor (Linux) swaps QEMU processes that contain guests, to
the point where there are intervals of duration TOS-check when some guests—and their
embedded incrementers—do not run, causing the OS enforcer to kill. An improved
OS enforcer would incorporate further inside information, not penalizing a guest in
cases when the guest is ready to run but starved for cycles. Second, when the network
is heavily loaded, the communication channel between hypervisor enforcer and hyper-
visor inspector degrades, causing the hypervisor enforcer sometimes (in out of of
our runs) to infer death and kill. As mentioned in Section . , a better design would set
Nhypervisor-retry adaptively. In the other transient conditions, Falcon’s inside information
prevents it from killing. For example, the app enforcer measures Tapp-resp based on
time (§ . ), so a long block (e.g., the “hung system call” row) does not cause a kill.
. . What are the computational costs of deploying Falcon?
Falcon’s benefits derive from gathering inside information with spies. Such platform-
specific logic incurs computational costs and programmer effort. We address the former
in this section and the latter in the next one.
Falcon’s main computational cost is time to execute periodic local checks
(described in Section . ). To assess this overhead we run a Falcon-enabled target with
an idle dummy application for minutes, inducing no failures. We then run the same
target and application but with the Falcon components disabled (and with QEMU and
libvirtd enabled). In both cases, we measure the accumulated time over the run,
reporting the overhead of Falcon as the difference between the accumulated
times divided by the run length.
Figure . tabulates the results. For the most part, Falcon’s overhead is
small (less than % per component). e exception is the QEMU process in the hyper-
visor layer. Two factors contribute to this overhead. First, the Falcon-enabled virtual
machine is scheduled more frequently than the Falcon-disabled virtual machine (be-
cause of Falcon’s multiple checks per second in the former case versus an idle application
in the latter case). To control for this effect, we perform the same experiment above,
except that we run another application, alongside the dummy, that uses % of the
. Under these conditions, as depicted in Figure . , QEMU contributes only . %
overhead in the Falcon-enabled case. Second, the remaining overhead is from QEMU’s
reading guest virtual memory inefficiently (when requested by the OS enforcer; see
§ . ). We verified this by separately running the experiment above (Falcon enabled,
overhead (percent of a core’s cycles)
component (§ . ) app uses no
app uses %
app inspector . .
app enforcer . .
incrementer . .
VM total . % . %
OS enforcer (main) . .
OS enforcer (worker) . .
libvirtd . .
QEMU . .
hypervisor inspector . .
hypervisor total . % . %
hypervisor enforcer . .
switch total . % . %
Figure . : Background overhead of our Falcon implementation, under an idle
dummy application and under one that consumes % of its . Each enforcer per-
forms a local check times per second. e switch’s overhead is less than one part
in , so displays as . QEMU’s contribution to the overhead is explained in the
text.
% usage by the dummy application) except that memory reads by the OS en-
forcer were disabled. e difference in QEMU’s usage was . %, explaining nearly
all of the usage difference between the Falcon-enabled and Falcon-disabled cases.
To mitigate the overhead of QEMU’s guest memory reads, we could increase
TOS-check (which would reduce the number of checks but increase detection time) or
improve the currently unoptimized implementation of guest memory reads.
. . What is the code and complexity trade-off?
Although we can use Falcon in legacy software (as in § . . , where the gain was avail-
ability), Falcon provides an additional benefit to the applications that use it: shedding
complexity. However, this is not “moving code around”: the platform-specific logic re-
quired by Falcon has a simple function (detect a crashed layer and kill it if necessary)
module (§ . ) spy component (§ . ) lines of code
platform-independent modules
thread in app; glue (C ) app inspector
thread in app; glue (Java) app inspector
shared enforcer code all enforcers
client library client library
client library glue (Java) client library
platform-independent total
platform-spec c modules
app enforcer process app enforcer
incrementer OS inspector
kernel module OS inspector
libvirt extensions OS enforcer
OS enforcer (main) OS enforcer
OS enforcer (worker) OS enforcer
libvirtd extensions OS enforcer




getStatus() for Paxos (from [ ]) app inspector
getStatus() for primary-backup app inspector
getStatus() for ZooKeeper [ ] app inspector
Figure . : e modules in our Falcon implementation and their lines of code. e
platform-independent modules assume a POSIX system.
while the logic shed in applications is complex (tolerate mistakes in an unreliable failure
detector).
Figure . tabulates the lines of code in our implementation, according to an
existing tool [ ]. (We do not count external libraries in our implementation: sfslite
for RPC functions, yajl for JSON functions, and libbridge for functions on the switch.)
e platform-specific total is fewer than lines. e application-specific code is
much smaller, for our sample implementations of getStatus() (though a production
application might wish to embed more intelligence in its getStatus()).
Next, we assess the gain to applications that use failure detectors (FDs). Exam-
replication approach lines of code processes
Paxos (from [ ]) 3
Primary-backup 2
Figure . : Comparison of two different approaches to replicating state machines:
Paxos [ ], as implemented in [ ], and primary-backup [ ], as implemented by us. e
Paxos row excludes FD code and generated RPCs. e primary-backup approach is
fewer lines of code because it is simpler: it does not tolerate unreliable failure detection.
Primary-backup also has % lower replication overhead in the usual case.
ples of such applications are ZooKeeper, Chubby, state machine replication libraries,
and systems that use end-to-end timeouts based on pings of remote hosts. As noted at
the start of this chapter, unreliable failure detectors necessitate complex algorithms to
handle failure detector mistakes; for example, it might use Paxos [ ] for replication.
However, if the application has access to a reliable failure detector (as provided by Fal-
con), then it can use simpler approaches; for example it can use primary-backup [ ]
for replication. Measuring simplicity is difficult, but we compare the lines of code in
( ) PMP—which uses a static timer for failure detection and Paxos for replication (see
§ . . )—and ( ) a replication library that we implemented, which uses Falcon for fail-
ure detection and primary-backup for replication. To make the comparison like-to-like,
we exclude PMP’s failure detection code from the count.
Figure . lists the numbers, again according to the tool used above [ ]. e
difference is lines, which is % of the original code base. Additionally, primary-
backup has lower replication overhead than Paxos: to tolerate a crash, Paxos requires
three processes while primary-backup requires just two.
Assessing Falcon’s reliability. e simplification results only if Falcon is truly
reliable, meaning that it reports “down” only if the target is down. Falcon’s spies are
carefully designed and implemented not to violate this property, and in our experience,
Falcon has never reported an up target as “down”. However, we cannot fully guarantee
reliability without formally verifying our implementation.
A non-example is an application that uses ZooKeeper, Chubby, or another higher-level service that
itself incorporates FDs. In these cases, the simplicity benefit of Falcon accrues to the higher-level service,
not its user.
. Summary & discussion
is section summarizes Falcon and discusses the limitations of our implementation.
Summary: revisiting the three challenges. Chapter describes three challenges in
building a fast failure reporting service; we revisit these in the context of Falcon.
Systematically collecting inside information. Falcon collects inside information with a net-
work of layer-specific modules called spies. Spies are bicameral, with an inspector em-
bedded in the monitored layer and an enforcer in the layer below. In occupying two
layers, Falcon’s spies hierarchically monitor one another implicitly, without requiring
communication among spies. e key observation motivating this design choice is that
encapsulation of layers causes higher-level layers to share fate with lower-level ones
(e.g., a crashed virtual machine takes its processes down with itsel ). is design al-
lows enforcers to expose a common interface, which simplifies the collection of inside
information as done by Falcon’s client library.
De ning an interface for reporting failures. Falcon exposes a reliable failure detector inter-
face, which reports processes as “up” or “down” and guarantees that processes reported
as “down” are permanently crashed. Applications benefit from this interface because
they need not doubt the failure detector, and can thus eschew complex majority-based
techniques (e.g., Paxos [ ]) in favor of simpler algorithms (e.g., Primary-Backup [ ]
or Chain replication [ ]). However, providing this interface has a price: Falcon’s
spies sometimes kill their monitored layer in order to make progress. Killing for cer-
tainty is not new ( in high-availability clusters [ ]), even with “virtual” killing
( [ ] excludes processes suspected of failure), though achieving certainty by killing
targeted layers is new.
Limiting negative impact. Falcon’s design limits its negative impact in two ways. First,
killing layers can be disruptive, so Falcon kills surgically. Unlike prior implementations
of , Falcon does not always kill at the granularity of machines (real or virtual):
Falcon only kills suspected components, and sometimes does not kill. Second, Falcon’s
design limits the cost of deploying spies: instead of a allowing processes to query spies
directly (potentially causing thousands of checks per second), spies operate indepen-
dently (with only tens of checks per second) and execute a callback in the rare case that
there is a problem.
Limitations of our implementation. We now discuss three limitations of our cur-
rent implementation. First, spies would be more coherent and modular with a uniform
inspector-enforcer communication protocol. Currently, extending Falcon to support
new layers (e.g., in a system without virtualization, or by adding, say, a JVM spy) re-
quires both modifying current spies and implementing new ones. A uniform protocol
would eliminate the need to modify existing spies, and promote code reuse.
Second, Falcon is tied to a strict layering scheme, where each layer encloses the
next. Such layering may not be the case, for example, in networks where there may
be many paths between end-hosts. We designed an extension to Falcon that handles
the case that an end-host is connected to multiple switches, and even extended this
design to the full network. However, crashing network switches would be prohibitively
expensive, especially if there was any chance a spy monitoring a network switch might
make a mistake, so we designed Falcon to hang when there is a network partition.
Finally, Falcon offers no access control. is is a vulnerability because starting
a too-short end-to-end timer via the reliable failure detector interface can needlessly
crash a machine. A real deployment of Falcon would need to extend the client library
and spies so that buggy or malicious applications could not send () RPCs to spies.
Chapter
Albatross: using new network interfaces for fast failure reporting
And I had done a hellish thing,
And it would work ’em woe:
For all averred, I had killed the bird
at made the breeze to blow.
Ah wretch! said they, such birds to slay,
at made the breeze to blow!
- Samuel Taylor Coleridge, e Rime of the Ancient Mariner
In the prior chapter we described Falcon, a failure reporting service that exposes a
reliable failure detector interface in order to realize the benefits of Chandra and Toeug’s
perfect failure detector [ ]. However, Falcon cannot handle network failures because its
spies rely on network communication to report the failure of their monitored layers to
the client library. us, Falcon’s clients, by design, remain ignorant of any failures while
there is a network partition. is design decision was based on the assumption that
network failures are both infrequent and catastrophic (e.g., they disrupt vital services
like DNS).
Unfortunately, this assumption—even in the context of data centers—is incor-
rect. After building Falcon, we analyzed a year-long trace of the failures that occurred in
is chapter revises [ ]: J. B. Leners, T. Gupta, M. K. Aguilera, and M. Walfish. Taming uncertainty
in distributed systems with help from the network, In EuroSys, Apr. . Co-authors Marcos K. Aguilera and
Michael Walfish contributed to the presentation and design of Albatross. Trinabh Gupta contributed to
the design, implementation, and evaluation of Albatross.
several data centers of a company with a strong Internet presence, using similar meth-
ods to Gill et al. [ ]. Data center operators collected the events generated by in-device
monitoring into a central repository using monitoring protocols (such as SNMP [ ])
or manual intervention. Events have associated meta-data, including what type of de-
vice failed, and whether the failure was masked by redundancy; we used these tags to
determine which events created partitions.
We found that large data centers (more than a thousand network elements) had
about partitions per month, of which about half disconnected an entire rack; the rest
disconnected a single host. e partitions in the larger data centers never disconnected
more than a single rack (owing to path redundancy), but we found that smaller data
centers (fewer than network elements) experienced multi-rack partitions. With
this information in mind, we focus attention on partitions in a single data center that
affect a subset of the network.
We presentAlbatross to address the problem of network failures, a failure report-
ing service that uses the network itself, both for gathering inside information and for
converting suspicion into fact. e key observation in the design of Albatross is that
the programmable interfaces exposed by modern data center networks, such as Soft-
ware Defined Networks (SDNs), can be readily used for both purposes. Specifically,
Albatross uses SDN to gather inside information about network and host failures, and
to prevent processes suspected of failure from communicating on the network.
Albatross consists of a host module (installed on the hosts of applications that
use the service) and a manager (which runs on few replicated servers). e host module
communicates with the manager and exposes an interface that a process can query to
learn the failure status of remote processes. Using SDN functionality, the managers
gather inside information about the state of the network, determine which processes
are reachable, and enforce their determinations by installing drop rules on switches.
In addressing the first two challenges of building a fast failure reporting service
(Chapter ), Albatross uses SDN (and a Falcon spy) to systematically collect inside in-
formation, and, like Falcon, Albatross exposes a binary interface for reporting failures.
However, Albatross cannot sidestep the fundamental issues of communicating failures
Albatross uses a modified Falcon spy to gather inside information about process failures.
across network partitions. Instead, Albatross relaxes the guarantees of the reliable fail-
ure detector interface by providing asymmetric guarantees: it categorizes processes as
excluded or non-excluded and promises reliable answers only to non-excluded processes.
We find that these guarantees are useful to applications, and sufficient to provide the
benefits of Falcon’s reliable failure detector interface, under certain conditions (§ . ).
By using SDN to block individual processes, Albatross reduces its negative im-
pact; Albatross avoids the collateral damage of killing hosts (which exists in Falcon) and
can make progress during network partitions without disconnecting entire switches or
subnetworks. Specifically, Albatross never disables an entire switch, or even an entire
end-host. However, Albatross’s drop rules consume a scarce resource, namely the mem-
ory in switches for storing these rules [ ]. To work within this constraint, Albatross
names processes according to their starting time and enclosing application; this naming
scheme allows aggregation of drop rules when failures affect many processes.
Albatross faces an additional challenge in that Albatross itself a distributed sys-
tem and, as such, is subject to the very failures that it wishes to detect and report. To be
useful, Albatross must function under reasonable and common failures. (As an analogy,
a fire alarm must function under usual types of fires.) To handle these failures, Alba-
tross internally uses the replicated state machine approach [ , ] and a majority-based
technique (Paxos [ ]), which requires that a majority of the servers are responsive and
mutually connected; Albatross achieves this by requiring careful placement of its man-
agers (§ . . ).
In evaluating Albatross (§ . ), we find that it has low costs: it requires a small
amount of state in the network (fewer than rules per switch to enforce disconnection),
and uses little and memory. Yet, it detects network failures an order of magnitude
more quickly than ZooKeeper [ ] configured to act as a failure reporting service (we
will refer to this service as simply “ZooKeeper”). is advantage owes to the design
of Albatross: if ZooKeeper were to lower its timeouts to achieve the same speed, its
servers would be overwhelmed (§ . . ).
Furthermore, we demonstrate that Albatross’s guarantees are useful to applica-
tions: Albatross can be used similarly to a perfect failure detector in distributed algo-
































Figure . : High-level view of Albatross. e host module provides the API through
which applications use Albatross; the host module helps detect crashes of local pro-
cesses. e manager is replicated at dedicated servers and coordinates Albatross’s re-
sponse to network and host failures. e manager interacts with the network through
an abstract interface, and notifies clients about partitioned processes.
. Overview of Albatross
Albatross is a failure reporting service that a process of a distributed application can
query to learn about the status of a remote process. e status can be “disconnected”
or “connected”; roughly, “disconnected” means crashed or partitioned, and “connected”
means alive and reachable. If Albatross reports a process as “disconnected”, it is safe to
assume that process cannot affect the world.
Components. Figure . depicts the components of Albatross.We survey them briefly
below. (Section . gives details).
e manager detects, enforces, and reports network failures. Detecting and en-
forcing happens via a network interface that abstracts SDN-like features. Reporting hap-
pens by calling back client processes that have registered for notifications. e manager
is a single logical entity that is replicated over several servers, using state machine repli-
Function Description
becomeAlbatrossProcess(appid) register target process of app
handle init((IP, proto, port), cb) monitor a target, given by (IP, proto, port). callback cb
is invoked when the target fails or is partitioned
query(handle) return the state of target
startTimer(handle, timeout) start timeout on target
stopTimer(handle) cancel timeout on target
ackDisconnect() acknowledge disconnection
Figure . : e Albatross API.
cation [ , ]. A host module detects and reports local process failures to remote host
modules; like the manager, this component uses callbacks for reporting. Much of the
logic for detecting local process failures is borrowed from Falcon (Chapter ). e host
module also implements the Albatross API, described immediately below.
Albatross API. Figure . shows the Albatross API; Figure . gives an example
use of the API and explains what causes communication among the components in
Figure . . A monitoring process is known as a client; a monitored process is called
a target. To request monitoring, a client calls init(); this call generates a message to
the target’s host. Albatross returns notifications about the target via a client-supplied
callback function or in response to query().
e API serves three other purposes. First, processes register as targets with
Albatross, by invoking becomeAlbatrossProcess(appid). is call may generate a mes-
sage to the manager, which tracks applications. e specified appid should uniquely
identify the application and should be used by all processes of the application.
Second, clients use the API to set an end-to-end timeout that serves as a back-
stop when Albatross cannot otherwise detect a problem. Specifically, Albatross expects
a client process to call startTimer() when it is waiting for a message from a target pro-
cess and to call stopTimer() when it receives the expected message. If the timer fires,
Albatross disconnects the target and reports “disconnected”.
ird, disconnected targets can reconnect, by calling ackDisconnect() (possibly
after rolling back state), at which point monitoring clients must call init() again.
Action Resulting communication
. target calls becomesAlbatrossProcess() target host module sends “register” RPC to the
manager
. client calls init(...), gets handle client host module sends “monitor” RPC to the
target’s host module
. client calls query(handle), none
gets “connected”
. target crashes target host module or manager sends RPC to the
client’s host module; host module invokes client
callback (if any)
. client calls query(handle), none
gets “disconnected”
. target recovers, calls ackDisconnect() target host module sends “de-register” RPC to
the manager (not shown)
. client calls init(...), gets new handle client host module sends “monitor” RPC to the
target’s host module
. client calls query(handle), none
gets “connected”
Figure . : Example sequence of actions using the Albatross API and the resulting
communication by Albatross.
Informal contract. Albatross covers all host failures and common network failures.
Its reports are reliable but asymmetric: it excludes some processes, and promises that
“disconnected” reports are reliable only to non-excluded processes. Intuitively, the non-
excluded processes are the ones that a majority of Albatross manager replicas can reach.
ese guarantees are formalized in Section . .
In addition, Albatross provides fast (sub-second) detection time achieved through
its overall architecture: visibility into the network (which provides timely information),
callbacks (which enable low latency without the overhead of frequent polling), etc. Of
course, one way to provide speed is to indiscriminately disconnect processes at any
suspicion of a problem, but Albatross also limits negative impact by using inside infor-
mation.
Rationale. Reporting all network failures is impossible [ ]. Similarly, providing
reliable, symmetric reports seems infeasible: how can a service give a report to a node
that it cannot reach? Of course, just because a contract is feasible does not mean that it is
useful to an application (Albatross could promise to return the string “pls grant degree”
always, which is feasible to implement but useless). Fortunately, Albatross’s guarantees
are useful to applications (§ . . ), though there are some small corner cases, covered in
the next section.
. Albatross’s contract
is section precisely describes Albatross’s guarantees. We will define a set of excluded
processes, and the guarantees will be asymmetric: assurances are granted only to pro-
cesses outside the excluded. e high-level concepts of exclusion and asymmetric guar-
antees have appeared before [ , ] but not, to our knowledge, in our specific context
of failure reporting services.
Albatross’s guarantees refer to a notion of time, which is a logical time; we are
not assuming that entities in Albatross have synchronized clocks. We say that a process
p cannot reach process q at time t if a message sent by p at time t would fail to be delivered
to q (because, for example, q crashes before the packet arrives, or there are no routes
to q, or the routes to q disappear as the packet is traveling, etc.). Observe that this
definition of “reachable” collapses a message’s future and fate into a label associated
with the sending time (t). We say that processes p and q are partitioned at time t (or p is
partitioned from q at time t) if either p cannot reach q or q cannot reach p at time t.
e guarantees of Albatross are relative to a monotonically increasing set E of
excluded processes. Intuitively, these are the processes that Albatross disconnects from
the rest of the system (and the outside world). We denote by Et the membership of E
at time t. Albatross ensures the following:
• (Exclusion Monotonicity) Processes are excluded permanently. More precisely, if t ≤ t′
then Et ⊆ Et′ .
• (Isolation) Non-excluded processes do not receive messages from excluded processes. More
precisely, if p ∈ Et, q /∈ Et, and p sends a message to q at time t, then q never receives
that message. In particular, if q receives a message from p, that message must have
been sent before time t.
Exclusions are permanent, but in practice an application may wish to reconnect the
process. is is allowed and modeled by having the process assume a new id.
e next property states that a process is indeed excluded if something bad
happens to it:
• (Exclusion Completeness) If a process has a problem for sufficiently long, then it is eventually
excluded. If q has crashed, or q is permanently partitioned from a process that is never
excluded, then q ∈ Et for some t.
e above property does not guarantee immediate exclusion when the problem
occurs because the system may take some time to detect the problem; in practice, Alba-
tross should aim above the letter of its contract and should thus report failures quickly.
Also, exclusion is not guaranteed if q is partitioned temporarily, because the partition
can heal before Albatross notices it. Similarly, exclusion is not guaranteed if q is parti-
tioned from a process r that later gets excluded, because the exclusion of r may happen
before Albatross notices the partition between q and r.
e final property states that queries by a non-excluded process return “discon-
nected” or “connected” according to whether the remote process is excluded.
• (Correspondence) If a process is excluded then eventually a query about it by a non-excluded
process always returns “disconnected”. Moreover, a query about a process by a non-excluded
process returns “disconnected” only if the process is excluded. More precisely, if q ∈ Et
then there is a time tq such that, for all t′ > tq, a query about q by p /∈ Et′ returns
“disconnected”. If p /∈ Et and a query about q by p returns “disconnected” at time t,
then q ∈ Et.
All properties above are conditional; Albatross provides them if the application
follows the expectations in Section . (processes register, set backstop timeouts, etc.),
and if a majority of Albatross managers remains alive and mutually connected (per the
fault-tolerance discussions at the start of this chapter and in . . ).
Consequences of the guarantees, and an example.
• Albatross may return incorrect answers to queries done by excluded processes. is
asymmetry is acceptable: to the non-excluded part of the system—which includes the
outside world—these processes are as good as dead.
• Messages sent by an excluded process before Albatross reports a partition may still
be received by a non-excluded process after Albatross’s report. However, all of the
non-excluded processes know that thesemessages causally precede Albatross’s report
because of the Isolation property, and can act accordingly (e.g., by dropping stale
messages).
• Excluded processes may continue to interact with, and affect, each other. us, prior
to reconnecting, excluded processes must rollback their state to some checkpoint
that causally precedes [ ] Albatross’s “disconnected” report. By rolling back their
state, excluded processes accept their effective deaths, and can be safely reintegrated
using standard catch-up techniques (e.g., replay).
• It is possible for a crashed process to be temporarily reported as “connected”; the
Completeness and Correspondence properties together imply that if a process has
crashed or been partitioned, Albatross eventually reports it as “disconnected”.
As an example, we consider a primary-backup application [ ], and then explain when the
guarantees of Albatross require some care in the context of this example. In a primary-
backup application, the primary receives a request from a client, replicates that request
at the backup, and only then executes the request and responds. is setup provides
fault-tolerance through the invariant that replication happens before responding to the
requestor. For availability, the application needs a way to make progress if the primary
or backup fails, which is where a failure reporting service like Albatross comes into play.
If a backup learns that its primary is “disconnected” it can immediately take over and
operate autonomously because it knows that Albatross is preventing the (old) primary
from using the network.
We now consider the effect of the consequences listed above for a primary-
backup application. First, suppose that the backup receives a request from the primary
after it hears that the primary is “disconnected”. e backup can safely discard this
message because it knows that the primary could not have responded to the requesting node
(causally) before it was excluded (and if it responds to the requesting node causally after
exclusion, then the requesting node is also excluded, by Isolation). e italicized phrase
holds because during the period when the primary was not excluded, it would have
correctly observed the backup as “connected” (by Correspondence), and thus waited
for an acknowledgment from the backup before responding to the requesting node.
Second, suppose a backup “takes over” for a non-excluded primary (a potential
split-brain scenario). A correct backup will take over only if it hears that the primary is
“disconnected”; since the primary is not in fact excluded, then the backup must be (by
Correspondence). us, the “take-over” by the backup is something akin to a delusion
(experienced by the backup and perhaps other excluded hosts).
ird, we consider reconnection. An excluded replica may eventually learn that
it is excluded, for example, by querying its own state or receiving a “you are discon-
nected” message from the other replica. en, the replica must determine a checkpoint
from before it was excluded and rollback to it before reconnecting (via ackDisconnect())
and then replaying. For an excluded backup, a suitable checkpoint would be the one
prior to the last request received from the primary.
Finally, the application may be unavailable while the backup waits to learn of
the primary’s failure.
. Detailed design
is section describes Albatross’s design, bottom up; we begin with the scheme by
which processes are named and end with the core logic that enforces partitions and
rehabilitates processes. Section . describes notable implementation details.
. . Names and identifiers
Under Albatross, each target process receives a process id (pid) when it registers (§ . )
with the host module. is pid uniquely identifies the process in terms of its host,
application, and birth period. A pid contains the following fields:
Primitive Description
(switch, appid, port) drop incoming traffic of application appid entering port
of a switch
(switch, epoch, port) drop incoming traffic of epoch entering port of a switch
(switch, pid) drop all incoming traffic of process pid at a switch
(destination) request topology information and failure events to be
sent to a destination
Figure . : Network interface used by Albatross.
• A host id (for example, an IP address);
• An application id (appid), which is programmer-supplied and unique to applications
within the given network (§ . );
• A local id, which differentiates multiple processes of the same application on the
same host; and
• An epoch number, which identifies the epoch in which the process registered.
Epochs are determined by the manager; an epoch corresponds to a view of the network’s
topology and partitions.
Pids are carried in packets. Albatross uses the fields of a pid to create partitions
(by filtering traffic). e choice of field depends on the desired granularity of a parti-
tion. For example, Albatross uses epochs when it needs to create a partition affecting
an entire rack of end-hosts. We describe the interface for enforcing partitions next.
. . Network interface
As noted earlier, Albatross relies on SDN-like functionality from the network (though
SDNs per se are not required to implement Albatross, as discussed in Section . ).
Here, we describe the functionality in terms of an abstract interface, depicted in Fig-
ure . . (Section . . describes an implementation of this interface, using OpenFlow
and NOX [ ].)
and tell a switch to block incoming traffic that (a) enters
the given port and (b) matches the given appid or epoch (§ . . ). tells a switch to
block traffic belonging to a given process id on all ports. Albatross also requires the abil-
ity to undo , , and (not shown in Figure . ). tells
switches where to send information about network topology and failure events. Events
of interest are link failure, indicating that a link is deemed down; and end-host failure,
indicating that a host connected to a port is deemed down. ese events are Albatross’s
inside information from the network, and are sent to the manager, as described next.
. . Manager
Albatross’s manager coordinates the response to end-host and network failures.
Network failures. At a high level, the manager tracks the network topology; when the
topology experiences a partition, the manager chooses a main partition, asks switches
at the edge of the main partition to block the traffic of Albatross applications coming
from outside the partition, and then calls back clients to notify them about which pro-
cesses have been disconnected. is procedure does not affect applications not using
Albatross; it also does not affect applications that use Albatross but are launched after
the failure is resolved. (One can think of this approach as virtualizing partitions, in that
different applications see different views of the network topology.)
In more detail, the manager runs the logic in Figure . . e manager maintains
a model of the current network topology. Upon starting the manager requests notifica-
tions about topology changes using (our implementation assumes that the
manager also begins with a correctly configured base topology; a more ambitious im-
plementation could build the topology as switches join). When the manager receives
an end-host failure or link failure event, it updates its model. If the model has a parti-
tion, the manager chooses an excluded set P of switches and hosts. P is chosen to be all
switches and hosts outside the largest strongly connected component that is reachable
by a majority of manager replicas. Ties are broken arbitrarily.
Before Albatross reports a problem to clients, the manager enforces the parti-
tion: it invokes or for every switch port bordering P. e choice
of primitive carries a trade-off. On the one hand, if the port bordering P connects to an
end-host, then the manager uses : each end-host has a small set of applications,
at startup call (sel )
function handle_failure_event(link):
remove link from topology
if topology has a new partition:
enforced : false





for each switch.port connecting to P:
try:
if switch.port connects to an end-host:
for each appid in activeAppid running at end-host:
call (switch, appid, switch.port) // may generate exception
else: // switch.port connects to another switch
for each epoch in activeEpochs:








broadcast list of hosts in P and activeEpochs
Figure . : Logic for detecting, enforcing, and reporting partitions.
so enforcing a partition requires few per-application rules. On the other hand, if the
port bordering P connects to another switch, using would require a rule for
each application whose traffic is carried by the switch—potentially hundreds of rules.
Instead, the manager handles this case by excluding at coarser granularity: it uses
, which tells that switch, and only that switch, to exclude all applications of active
epochs. While compromises on surgical disconnection, we note, first, that
applications that begin in a new epoch are not affected, since the use of
induces a change of epoch. Second, is invoked only when a switch fails or
is partitioned; the common case, end-host failures, is handled with .
If the call to or fails, the manager adds the switch to P
and continues. If the manager cannot use the network interface to install rules at any
switch, then Albatross may be unable to report some failures, but this case is rare and
means that the whole network is likely unusable.
When the procedure finishes, the manager broadcasts the list of hosts in P and
the affected epochs. is information is received by the Albatross host modules, which
mark the processes in P as down. e broadcast packets might be dropped; in that case,
Albatross can still detect failures using the client’s backstop timeout (see below)—albeit
more slowly.
Host and process failures. Albatross treats a host failure as a one-host network fail-
ure, using the mechanism described immediately above. Process crashes, however, are
handled differently; they separate into two cases. e first case is that a backstop time-
out (§ . ) fires; this event causes the monitoring process to request help from the man-
ager, which disconnects the target process, using . Figure . shows the detailed
logic. e second case is that a module running on the remote host is aware of a process
crash; this case does not involve the manager at all and is covered in Section . . .
is failure is detected with timeouts in the SDN control network. ese timeouts differ from
end-to-end timeouts because, first, they are monitoring a constrained component, and, second, SDN
control traffic can be prioritized, which wouldmakemessage latencies predictable and thus avoid spurious
timeouts. is is an example inside information.
function handle_backstop_timeout(client, pid):




for link in switch:
handle_failure_event(link)
reply_to_client(client)
Figure . : Logic to handle client backstop timeout on target pid.
Example. Consider the example network in Figure . . If switch reports to the
manager an end-host failure event about host , then the manager will install at switch
a rule for appids and . If switch reports a link-failure event for its link to
switch , or the manager suspects that switch has failed (e.g., because switch failed
to install a rule), the manager will install at switch a rule for
epochs and and choose an inactive epoch as the current epoch. e manager uses
instead of because requires two invocations, whereas
would require fifty-three (the fifty-one ids at switch plus appids and );
this choice is important because, as we will explain in Section . . , each invocation
consumes scarce resources at the switch. is example ignores how failures might affect
the manager; we describe the manager’s fault tolerance next.
Fault tolerance. Recall that the manager is replicated for fault tolerance (§ . ), fol-
lowing the state machine replication approach [ , ] with a majority-based technique
for fault tolerance (Paxos [ ]). If manager replicas are placed at diverse parts of the
network (such as different racks), then under common network partitions (described
in at the start of this chapter), the majority of servers remains with the majority of
network elements.
Even if the manager-majority partition holds a minority of processes of a particular application, that
minority can continue operating if the application does not use majority-based algorithms. Applications
using techniques like primary-backup [ ] or chain replication [ ] can make progress with even one
working process.
switch 1
switch 2 switch 3
other hosts host 1 host 2 other hosts
appids: 4-47 appids: 1, 2 appids: 2, 3 appids: 13-63
active epochs: 1, 3
manager
Figure . : Network for example of how Albatross’s manager enforces a partition.
Revisiting the guarantees. e formal guarantees (§ . ) reference a set E. is set is
never materialized explicitly. Instead, recall that the manager maintains a set P, which is
a set of (a) blocked processes, together with (b) a set of blocked applications, switches,
and hosts (keyed by epoch). Because appids and epoch ids imply a set of processes, P
implicitly represents the membership of E.
Albatross provides Completeness through the backstop timeout; if all else fails, a
client will eventually request that the manager block the target (Figure . ). Albatross
guarantees Isolation by configuring network switches to drop the traffic of excluded
processes (Figure . ). Albatross guarantees Monotonicity because it never unblocks
processes; however, it does recycle identifiers as described in the next section. e first
part of Correspondence is also provided by the backstop timeout; if a report from the
manager is dropped, the client will eventually timeout and request blockage of the tar-
get (forcing the manager to retry its message). e second part of Correspondence is
provided by the sequencing of events; the manager reports partitions only after enforc-
ing them.
Albatross provides speed by reacting to inside information (i.e., failure events)
as opposed to end-to-end timeouts, in the common case. It limits negative impact by
inspecting network state, using surgical rules, and allowing reconnection (described
next).
. . Reconnecting processes and recycling identifiers
We now describe how Albatross reconnects processes and recycles epochs and pids.
Although epochs change infrequently, they are important to recycle since, in our im-
plementation (§ . . ), there are only a handful of them, network-wide. Pids are scarce
because the local id field—which identifies a process within a given application on a
given host—is small.
Reconnecting processes. When a process tries to reconnect by calling ackDis-
connect() its host module gives it a new pid (§ . ,§ . ). Although Albatross’s contract
allows the host module to return any unallocated pid, in the interest of progress the host
module first checks that the new pid is not being blocked by any switch. To this end,
before allocating a new pid the host module asks the manager (a) what is the current
epoch, and (b) which of the host’s applications have been excluded (via ). If no
applications have been excluded, the host module returns a new pid with the current
epoch and appid. If applications have been excluded, the host module locally blocks the
processes belonging to those applications using a packet filter, asks the manager to undo
the blanket exclusion (meaning, undo the calls at the edge switch), and only
then returns the new pid. e order of these steps is important to upholding the Isola-
tion property (§ . ); if the rules are undone before the excluded processes are
blocked by their host module locally, the excluded processes could affect non-excluded
processes.
Garbage collecting epochs. Recall that when the manager enforces a partition of
more than one end-host, it must activate a previously inactive epoch number. To allow
the manager to track which epochs are active, host modules inform the manager which
epochs they are using (by attaching a list to their normal messages to the manager).
When the manager sees that an active epoch is not used by any host module, it undoes
the for the epoch, and marks it inactive.
Garbage collecting pids. A host module must be careful about when it reuses
the pid of a process that has exited or has acknowledged a disconnection. Suppose that
a host module were to give to a new process the pid of a recently terminated process;
later, a third process could time out on the original terminated process and have the
manager enforce a partition using that pid, which would disrupt the new process. To
avoid this and similar scenarios, Albatross includes the following counting scheme.
Each pid has a counter that is physically stored at the host module that allocated
that pid (the local host); the counter tracks references to that pid held by other hosts.
e local host module increments (or decrements) the counter when it hears that a
remote process has started (or stopped) monitoring the associated process. A pid can
be reused when these conditions all hold: ( ) the pid of the process has reference count
zero, ( ) the local process has crashed or acknowledged the disconnection, and ( ) the
manager is not blocking the process’s pid (with ).
e challenge in keeping the counter accurate is that there can be failures, both
of clients referencing the pid and the host module storing the counter. To handle both
cases, the local host module tracks which clients have references in a persistent write-
ahead log; periodically, the local host module queries remote host modules to confirm
that clients referencing its allocated pids are still running.
. Selected implementation details
. . Packet marking
Figure . depicts the format of a pid. It consists of a -byte host identifier (the host’s
IP address in our implementation) together with per-process bits. e per-process
bits are the process’s epoch number, the appid, and the local id.
Under Albatross, a process’s pid appears in the source MAC address field of
the packets that it originates. If a packet is sent by a process that is not using Alba-
tross (including packets of ICMP, ARP, etc.), the bottom bits are set to zero. Only
the source MAC fields are used this way; the destination MAC field uses the usual
MACs, obtained from ARP. is scheme assumes a scalable layer-two network in the
data center (e.g., SEATTLE [ ]).
host id (IP addr) epoch appid local id
( bits) ( bits) ( bits) ( bits)
Figure . : Format of a Albatross process id (pid). Pids are six bytes; a process’s pid
appears in the source MAC address field of packets originated by the process. e num-
ber of epoch bits is small, but epochs are recycled (§ . . ). e local id disambiguates
multiple processes of the same application on the same host.
e scheme has three features. First, it is easy to identify the traffic of applica-
tions that use Albatross—by observing a non-zero value in the bottom bits. Second,
blocking the traffic of a process at a switch requires a single rule (to match the source
MAC); likewise, bit fields within the source MAC can be used to block the traffic of
an entire application or epoch with one rule. ird, once the rule is installed, it need
not be updated based on how and where the process sends data. By contrast, a scheme
that blocked based on source TCP or UDP ports would require one rule per port used
by the process, and updates in response to port changes. We discuss how this scheme
affects existing Layer protocols in Section . .
. . Network interface implementation
Our implementation of Albatross assumes a network with OpenFlow switches and a
NOX controller [ ]. Given this environment, one can implement the network in-
terface (Figure . , page ) as follows. e (switch, appid, port) and
(switch, epoch, port) primitives direct the NOX controller to install an Open-
Flow drop rule that matches on the appid or epoch bits of the pid; similarly, the
(switch, pid) primitive results in the installation of an OpenFlow drop rule that
matches the entire pid.
(destination) is implemented by augmenting the NOX controller to
forward topology changes and failure events to the destination (which is the Albatross
manager). Additionally, the destination needs to receive the link and end-host failure
events (§ . . ). Link failure events correspond to port- or link-down status events, and
OpenFlow switches (by nature) notify the controller of such events. e controller
simply forwards these notifications to the destination.
e more difficult case is end-host failure events. ese are not directly supported
by OpenFlow, so our implementation must synthesize them. Our solution leverages
SDN rule timeouts, as we describe next. Each host module sends a special heartbeat
packet to its switch every Theartbeat time units. On the first heartbeat, the switch sends
an unknown packet event to the SDN controller. e SDN controller then configures the
switch to (a) drop these heartbeat packets, and (b) send a timeout notification if the rule
is not used for Tnet-check time units. If the controller receives such a notification, it sends
an end-host failure event to the destination (the manager). Our implementation sets
Theartbeat to ms and Tnet-check to second (the smallest OpenFlow timeout); this setting
provides reasonably fast detection while tolerating dropped or delayed heartbeats.
. . Detecting process crashes
As noted in Section . . , process crash detection involves an additional module. at
module a Falcon spy (Chapter ) modified to drop an unresponsive process’s traffic
locally, instead of terminating it with a . is modification reduces the negative
impact of a false suspicion.
. . Miscellaneous implementation details
• Each host module caches the status of monitored target processes: when a client’s
host module receives a notification from a target’s host module or from the manager,
the client’s module invokes the relevant callback function (Figure . ) and stores the
“disconnected” for future queries.
• Albatross’s manager is separate from the SDN controller. e manager’s solution
to replication makes use of a library [ ]. (§ . discusses SDN controller fault-
tolerance.)
• A final detail is interprocess communication (IPC). Albatross must enforce Isolation
even when processes are on the same host. us, Albatross requires that all IPC be
sent through the host’s top-of-rack switch. If this requirement is burdensome (e.g.,
if processes use IPC extensively), two local processes can share the same Albatross
pid, with the tradeoff that that Albatross treats such processes as a unit.
where injected? what failure is injected? what does the failure model?
network link failure network partition
network switch failure network partition
network misconfiguration that causes a partition operator error
network host floods UDP traffic sudden traffic spike
network dropped OpenFlow messages problems in the SDN
network spurious failure event link flapping
end-host process crash (segfault) problem in the application
end-host host crash (kernel panic) machine crash or reboot
Albatross crash of host module bug in host module
Albatross crash of leader in manager bug in manager
Figure . : Panel of synthetic failures. We inject failures in the network, at the end
hosts, and into Albatross itself.
. Evaluation of Albatross
In this section, we evaluate how Albatross addresses the three challenges of Chapter —
systematically collecting inside information, choosing an interface for reporting that
information, and limiting negative impact. First, we evaluate the benefits of using inside
information in Albatross’s architecture for reporting host and network failures (§ . . ).
Second, we evaluate Albatross’s interface by reprising the benefits of a failure reporting
service that provides reliable reports of failure showing in the process that Albatross’s
specific contract is sufficient to derive these benefits (§ . . ). ird, we evaluate how
well Albatross limits its negative impact (§ . . ).
All experiments run on a prototype network (with switches connected in a
complete ternary tree) implemented using QEMU/KVM [ ] virtual machines (ver-
sion . . ) and CPqD OpenFlow . software switches [ ]. e hypervisor is a -core
Dell PowerEdge R with AMD Opteron Processors and GB of memory, running
Linux (kernel version . . -gentoo-r ). e network controller is NOX [ ], modified
to work with OpenFlow . [ ].
failure type action taken by Albatross
link failure the network interface reports link failures (§ . . ); the manager
detects a partition, enforces an excluded set, and reports it to clients
(Figure . )
switch failure handled as the above
network
misconfiguration
detected by client timeout (§ . ) and enforced by the manager’s
backstop logic (Figure . )
network flooding no failure is detected
dropped OpenFlow
messages
detected by an OpenFlow timeout in the SDN controller; the
controller treats this as a switch failure and reports it to the manager
as multiple link failure events (Figure . )
spurious failure event handled as a link failure (see above)
host crash detected with an end-host failure event (§ . . ), and enforced by the
manager (Figure . )
process crash Falcon spy (Ch. , § . ) detects and reports failure (§ . . )
crash of host module detected by backstop timeout (§ . ) and enforced by the manager
(§ . . )
crash of manager
replica partition
replication library (§ . . ) elects a new leader (§ . . ), then the
manager handles the failure as above
Figure . : Albatross’s reaction to the failure panel (Figure . ). Albatross detects all
failures save network flooding (a non-failure), and its enforcement actions affect only
applications that use it.
. . Does Albatross’s design yield a fast failure reporting service?
We now experimentally investigate the qualities of Albatross: (a) how it responds to
failures, and (b) how its timeliness compares with two baseline mechanisms. e ex-
periments use a panel of synthetic failures, depicted in Figure . . ese failures model
problems in the network, at end-hosts, and in Albatross itself; link and switch failures
are derived from the failure analysis described at the start of this chapter. While de-
ploying Albatross on physical hardware and measuring its response to failures in the
wild would be better than a synthetic evaluation, this is beyond our scope as we cur-
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Figure . : Detection time and coverage of Albatross (A), compared to Falcon (Chap-
ter ) (F) and ZooKeeper [ ] (Z). Error bars are minimum and maximum observed
detection times. Two of Falcon’s bars are labeled N/A because it does not detect link or
switch failures. Albatross detects failures quickly by using information at end-hosts and
in the network. ZooKeeper’s detection time reflects its timeout ( seconds); a shorter
one causes overload (see text).
should be read as suggestive rather than conclusive.
How does Albatross respond to failures? We run an experiment where a client process
monitors a remote target process; we inject a failure of some chosen type, affecting the
target process, and we record Albatross’s response. We repeat the experiment times
for each failure type.
We find that Albatross reacts the same way in the repetitions for a given
failure type; the reactions for each failure type are in Figure . .
Howdoes Albatross compare with baselinemechanisms? We take as baselines ( ) Zoo-
Keeper [ ], and ( ) Falcon. For each failure that Albatross detects (without using back-
stop timeouts), we repeat the aforementioned experiments times and measure the
detection time from when the failure occurs to when it is reported to the application.
We experiment with Albatross and with ZooKeeper. For Falcon, we report the results
of Chapter (because two of Falcon’s spies are incompatible with the testbed used for
Albatross).
Figure . shows the results. Network problems are detected byAlbatross quickly,
usually in less than a second. e specifics of these numbers depend on the implemen-
tation of our testbed’s switches, which are software switches; deploying Albatross on
real hardware may have different performance characteristics, though we expect the
order of magnitude will be similar.
Process failures are detected by Falcon and Albatross quickly; Albatross is faster
than Falcon here (even though Albatross uses a Falcon spy to detect these failures)
because Falcon’s results include a delay for confirming that a process has left the process
table whereas Albatross needs only to install an iptables rule (§ . . ).
On host failures (e.g., kernel panics), Albatross takes second longer than Fal-
con; the difference is that Albatross detects host failures using OpenFlow rule time-
outs (§ . . ), which have a minimum duration of second. However, unlike Albatross,
Falcon cannot detect switch or link failures.
ZooKeeper’s detection speed reflects its timeout, which we configure to be sec-
onds, as suggested in its tutorial [ ]. is choice is not arbitrary: if one lowers Zoo-
Keeper’s timeout to match Albatross’s detection speed, ZooKeeper would be overloaded
by keep-alives. To establish this, we experiment with ZooKeeper. First, we find that
ZooKeeper can monitor targets, each using a second timeout on their leases.
But when we reduce the timeout to ms, ZooKeeper drops the connections of about
targets, even though the network is not saturated. We believe this effect is similar
to Burrows’s observations [ ]: timeouts shorter than second overwhelmed Chubby’s
servers in Google’s clusters (which monitor many more targets). In contrast, we find
that Albatross’s manager can monitor over targets. Essentially, ZooKeeper polls
clients with ping messages whereas Albatross watches for the causes of dropped pings
(crashes, partitions, etc.), and can thus react quickly.
. . What are the benefits of Albatross’s contract?
Chandra and Toueg established that perfect failure detectors (which allow all processes
to detect all crashes correctly) enable “easier” algorithms than unreliable failure de-
tectors, such as those based on end-to-end timeouts [ ] (see also Chapter , § . and
Chapter , § . . ). As just one example, Chain Replication [ ] (a form of primary-
backup) is simpler than Viewstamped Replication [ ], Paxos-based replication [ ],
and Raft [ ].
Albatross’s contract (§ . ), with its asymmetric guarantees, does not precisely
meet this theoretical ideal. us, this section investigates whether Albatross’s contract
is sufficient to provide the same qualitative benefits. We do this by illustrating what can
go wrong without reliable reports of failures; demonstrating that Albatross’s guarantees
are sufficient to simplify distributed algorithms; and describing the subtle relationships
among Albatross, ZooKeeper, and majority-based agreement.
Without reliable reports, what can go wrong? We use RAMCloud [ ] as a short
case study. RAMCloud is a storage system that keeps data in memory at a set of master
servers. ese servers also process client requests to read and write data. For durability,
a master server writes copies of data on the disks of multiple backup servers. A coordinator
manages the configuration of the servers (which servers are masters for what data, etc.).
To avoid losing writes or reading stale data, RAMCloud must guarantee that exactly
one master server is responsible for a piece of data. RAMCloud could use a reliable
failure reporting service, but RAMCloud instead uses several mechanisms internally:
short timeouts, self-killing, propagation of crash information, and coordination among
backups. ese mechanisms must be orchestrated carefully to handle corner cases.
We first determine if RAMCloud ever returns stale (incorrect) data. We inject
network failures at times carefully chosen to trigger the following corner case: a master
is transiently disconnected from the coordinator, causing the coordinator to initiate the
master’s recovery. We find that RAMCloud can indeed return incorrect data; this bug
was observed empirically and confirmed by the RAMCloud developers. Specifically,
RAMCloud detects failures using a short timeout of hundreds of milliseconds; if the
coordinator times out on a master, the coordinator starts data recovery, which is very
fast. Because the timeout is short and recovery is fast, the entire process may complete
before the old master realizes that it was replaced, resulting in two masters: a split-
brain scenario. Intuitively, the issue is that RAMCloud does not make its suspicion of
failure definitive (e.g., by waiting for the old master to shut down) before acting on that
suspicion.
We replaced RAMCloud’s failure detector with Albatross ( lines of C ) and
found that RAMCloud then worked correctly: when the master is reported as “discon-
nected”, it is excluded and cannot serve clients, by Correspondence and Isolation (§ . ).
is benefit is not unique to Albatross; other failure reporting services (such as Falcon)
could have prevented this error.
How do Albatross’s guarantees simplify algorithm design? As another case study, we
examine atomic broadcast: it is a building block of many distributed systems, and it has
solutions with and without reliable reports [ ]. We specifically compare (a) Zab [ ],
a protocol that uses majority-based agreement (as opposed to reliable reports), and
(b) Aab, a protocol that uses Albatross.
Zab: atomic broadcast without reliable reports. Zab [ ] takes a standard approach,
which we briefly summarize here. A leader orders messages. Because partitions can
result in multiple leaders (one leader becomes disconnected, another leader is elected,
and the original reconnects), the protocol relies on a majority (quorum) of processes
to approve leader actions. As a result, if two leaders try to act, only one succeeds in
getting approval from a majority.
Aab: atomic broadcast under Albatross. Under Albatross, processes can select a
unique leader by picking the smallest process id among processes that Albatross consid-
ers to be “connected”. is scheme works because, if there could be two non-excluded
leaders at the same time, let p be the one with higher id; then p considers the other
leader as “disconnected”, otherwise it would not have picked itself as leader. us, by
Correspondence (§ . ), the other leader is excluded—a contradiction. us, we have
essentially unique leaders. We say “essentially” because there could be many self-styled
leaders; however, all but one will be excluded.
Given (essentially) unique leaders, we can implement atomic broadcast using
a sequencer-based algorithm [ ], adapted to use Albatross. e algorithm proceeds
in periods; each period has a unique leader (chosen as described above). In each pe-
riod, a process that wants to broadcast a message sends it to the leader and waits for
an acknowledgment; if the leader changes, the process resends to the new leader (in
a new period). e leader handles each period in two phases, recovery and order. In





At most one leader? yes no
failures (f) tolerated relative to total processes (n) f < n f < n/2
Figure . : Comparison of atomic broadcast with and without definitive reports. Aab
uses Albatross (and would be similar if it used any other membership service), and
Zab [ ] uses majority-based agreement; both algorithms are described in the text.
the recovery phase, the leader completes the broadcast of pending messages from prior
periods (if any). In the order phase, the leader serves as a sequencer: it gets a new mes-
sage to broadcast, assigns it a sequence number, and sends it to processes for delivery.
Processes then deliver the messages in sequence number order.
Comparison. Figure . compares the two algorithms. Aab has fewer phases,
fewer round-trips, fewer message types, and fewer counters for ordering messages.
Moreover, it tolerates the failure of all but one process; Zab, by contrast, tolerates
the failure of fewer than half of the processes. (Equivalently, to tolerate f failures, the
Albatross-based Aab requires f+ 1 processes, whereas Zab requires 2f+1 processes.) e
fundamental source of these differences is that Zab is built on majority-based agree-
ment, which brings complexity.
Albatross vs. ZooKeeper vs. consensus vs. atomic broadcast. e preceding compar-
ison immediately raises a question. Namely, Albatross also uses majority-based techniques
internally—in fact, the consensus-based algorithm for replicating the manager (§ . ,
§ . . ) has the same qualitative complexity as Zab. So why is this fact omitted in the
Aab-vs-Zab comparison? Because under Albatross, the complexity is localized to the
manager and handled once; the clients of Albatross are not exposed to the complexity
and the additional resource cost is amortized over all clients of Albatross.
e same kind of amortization only works partway for Zab. ZooKeeper’s lease
server abstraction is built on Zab (Zab stands for “ZooKeeper atomic broadcast”; Zab
is used to order commands to a replicated lease server state machine), and the intent is
that many different applications can be clients of ZooKeeper’s lease server. However,
ZooKeeper cannot achieve the same performance under the same number of clients as
Albatross because short leases require frequent polling, which can overwhelm a server
with many clients; this is demonstrated in Section . . .
ZooKeeper could be modified to use Albatross. ZooKeeper is built on an atomic
broadcast interface, which is implemented by Zab (as noted above). We could replace
Zab with Aab. However, the resulting system would inherit the disadvantages of leases.
And, Albatross could be modified to use ZooKeeper. Albatross could replicate
its manager using ZooKeeper’s lease servers (or Zab directly). is represents an alter-
native instantiation of Albatross; it is essentially equivalent to the one covered in the
rest of this paper.
. . How does Albatross limit its negative impact?
We now evaluate how well Albatross limits its negative impact, focusing on its mech-
anism for disconnecting processes and the resources it uses at end-hosts and in the
network.
How well does Albatross limit interference? We evaluate whether some common
network behaviors might cause Albatross to disconnect processes without cause. We
inject two non-failures into our testbed: (a) heavy traffic (modeling congestion), and
(b) a spurious link failure event (modeling link flapping) for a link whose removal splits
the network. We observe that Albatross does not disconnect processes under heavy
traffic. Albatross does not detect a problem because the duration of the spike in traffic
is less than the client process’s end-to-end timeout. Albatross does disconnect under
the spurious failure. While this behavior is not ideal, it is not disastrous because, first,
a known down link may be better than persistent link flapping; second, Albatross does
not interfere if there are alternate paths or the link is not used by Albatross processes;
and third, applications can reconnect (§ . . ). Reconnection takes about one second in
our experiments.
max additional rules installed at a switch
rules installed rule
usage per component (§ . )
host module . %
manager . %
bandwidth used
at each end-host . kBps
at manager . kBps
Figure . : Summary of Albatross’s costs under link failure. Albatross uses few re-
sources. Scalability is discussed in the text.
What are Albatross’s other costs? We measure Albatross’s resource cost for detecting
and enforcing a partition for a single application. Figure . shows the results. As ex-
pected, Albatross installs one rule per application id before reporting the target process
as “disconnected”.
We must also consider what happens when there are more applications and
hosts. In general, the number of rules grows with the number of disconnected processes;
for example, a switch with disconnected end-hosts, each with distinct applications,
would have rules. Numbers like these are acceptable: the HP ProCurve J9451A
switch, for example, has capacity of OpenFlow rules [ ]. However, the linear
in-network costs could become undesirable. In that case, Albatross could reduce the
number of rules that it uses; on links that connect to end-hosts, it could block at the
granularity of epochs instead of appids (§ . . ), at the cost of possibly blocking addi-
tional processes.
Albatross uses few resources at the manager replicas in terms of and net-
work bandwidth. Albatross’s cost at end-hosts is higher, as the host module generates
heartbeat packets (§ . . ). However, the effect is local: these packets are dropped by a
host’s switch before entering the network.
Albatross is implemented with lines of C code.
. Summary & frequently asked questions
Albatross leverages SDN to gather inside information from the network and to enforce
its decisions about failures. is choice yields a design that can report failures quickly
while avoiding the collateral damage of killing entire machines, and it allows Albatross
to extend its coverage beyond Falcon’s to include common network failures. We now
answer some common questions about Albatross.
Does Albatross require SDNs? While the current implementation of Albatross uses
OpenFlow, Albatross requires relatively few things from the network: the ability to
receive failure events and to block traffic based on packet fields. ese requirements
are made explicit by the network interface (§ . . ), and Albatross can work in any
network where this interface can be implemented.
Is the SDN controller a single point of failure? is issue is mostly orthogonal to
Albatross. Albatross currently uses NOX, which is centralized and thus a single point
of failure. However, Albatross could instead use recent fault-tolerant controllers (see
Chapter , Section . ).
Must Albatross repurpose the source MAC field? Albatross’s embedding of process
identifiers in packets’ source MAC field (§ . . ) is not fundamental. Albatross could
use other space in packets: MPLS labels, a shim layer for Albatross, bits in an RPC
header, etc. e only requirement is that switches can filter packets based on these
fields.
How does Albatross’s MAC rewriting scheme affect existing Layer protocols? Un-
der existing Layer protocols, such as IEEE . d [ ], switches will use the source
MAC addresses of incoming packets to learn the mapping between MAC addresses
and output ports, for future forwarding decisions. Since Albatross’s MAC-rewriting
scheme creates source addresses that will never be used as destination addresses (§ . . ),
a Layer protocol deployed alongside Albatross should be modified to never learn
from these packets. Fortunately, Albatross works in the context of SDNs, and so many
Layer protocol changes would require only software changes at the SDN controller.
Can Albatross work with virtual machine migration? Albatross assumes that pro-
cesses and end-hosts remain stationary, which conflicts with virtual machine migra-
tion [ ]. is issue is surmountable, if the manager and migration mechanism collab-
orate to migrate filter rules, though we do not implement this.
Does Albatross consider network policy? Albatross models only the physical network
topology (§ . . ). Yet policies (e.g., ACLs) can constrain communication. e Alba-
tross manager might thus be unable to detect unreachability: it might think a path
exists, when in reality it is prohibited. is problem would be handled by the client’s
backstop timeout (§ . , § . . ).
Can cooperating applications have inconsistent views of the network? As mentioned
in Section . . , one can think of Albatross as virtualizing partitions. is “virtual-
ization” does not cause discrepancies in how applications see the network: Albatross
guarantees that, if a process is partitioned away, it is partitioned for all applications.
What are the security implications of Albatross? Processes can block any Albatross-
enabled process by starting and never canceling an end-to-end timeout (Figure . ).
Adding access control to Albatross’s API is future work.
Chapter
Pigeon: reporting inside information without violence
Cher Ami was a homing pigeon owned and own by the U.S. Army Signal Corps in
France during World War I. He helped save the Lost Battalion of the th Division
in the battle of the Argonne, October . In his last mission, he delivered a message
despite having been shot through the breast, being blinded in one eye, covered in blood,
and having a leg hanging only by a tendon. e bird was awarded the Croix de Guerre
for heroic service delivering important messages in Verdun, France.
- http://nationalpigeonday.blogspot.com/, retrieved Apr.
As argued in Chapter , uncertainty about whether a process is crashed or merely slow
is fundamental—even with access to local information. Even a Falcon spy, for example,
can be uncertain about whether a layer has failed (Chapter ). Uncertainty must be
handled carefully to avoid problems like split-brain scenarios.
Failure reporting services can handle uncertainty on behalf of their clients by
killing components when they suspect failure. However, killing to hide uncertainty
brings several issues: killing can take out functioning-but-slow process (see Chapter ,
§ . . ); killing can cause collateral damage, even when used judiciously (as discussed
in prior chapters); and killing is unnecessary if an application’s recovery strategy can
is chapter revises [ ]: J. B. Leners, T. Gupta, M. K. Aguilera, and M. Walfish. Improving avail-
ability in distributed systems with failure informers., In , Apr. . Co-authors Marcos K. Aguilera and
Michael Walfish contributed to the presentation and design of Pigeon. Trinabh Gupta contributed to
the presentation, design, implementation, and evaluation of Pigeon.
handle uncertainty (see Chapter , Section . . ), which is the case for most existing
applications.
ese problems with killing motivated us to consider a failure reporting service
that forgoes guaranteeing reliability for every report in favor of not killing. An appli-
cation would benefit from such a service because it could still use inside information
to report failures quickly. For example, Falcon-NoKill reports failures quickly without
reliable reports, thereby allowing ZooKeeper [ ] to recover from some failures more
quickly (see Figure . on page ). Embracing uncertainty yields two other benefits:
first, a failure reporting service’s design no longer needs to consider the collateral dam-
age of killing and second, the failure reporting service can guarantee that every failure
is eventually detected by relying on end-to-end timeouts as a backstop.
In the rest of this chapter, we describe Pigeon, a failure reporting service that
uses inside information and does not kill. Pigeon extends Falcon’s architecture to in-
clude network switches and routers to address the first challenge of coherently gathering
inside information, with an emphasis on reusing existing techniques and information.
e combination of nonviolence and Pigeon’s architecture helps to keep its negative im-
pact low, so only one of the three challenges presented in Chapter remains: choosing
an interface for reporting failures.
Pigeon implements a failure informer interface; this interface exposes four failure
conditions to its clients, each of which abstracts a different kind of failure, and can lead
to different recovery actions. An alternative would have been to keep a binary interface
of “up” and “down”, but with no guarantees associated with either report; however,
such an interface would miss an opportunity, as inside information about failure can
inform recovery action. For example, if a lease server [ ] knows that a lease holder
has crashed (because its main process is not in the process table), then the lease server
can immediately revoke that lease without waiting for a (potentially lengthy) timeout
to expire.
Although both Falcon and Albatross include a backstop timeout on end-to-end behavior, neither
service reports a failure to clients until the service itself has taken some action because an end-to-end
timeout does not guarantee that a failure occurred.
Albatross (Chapter ) also uses inside information from the network, but it requires a higher-level
interface than Pigeon (see Chapter , § . . ).
In evaluating Pigeon (§ . ), we find this interface benefits applications not only
by reporting failures quickly, but also by allowing applications to react in qualitatively
different ways to different failures. Furthermore, in a multidimensional study we find
that the failure informer interfaces allows Pigeon to improve upon Falcon and other
failure reporting services in at least one of the following: coverage (what failures can be
detected), detection time, or information beyond “up” or “down”. Both of these benefits
come at a low cost, in that Pigeon uses few system resources.
In the rest of this chapter we expand on the design choices in Pigeon (§ . ),
explain Pigeon’s design (§ . ), present a prototype implementation (§ . ), evaluate that
prototype (§ . ), and summarize and discuss the overall approach (§ . ).
. Design challenges and principles
As noted in Chapter , building a fast failure reporting service that uses inside infor-
mation presents three challenges: systematically collecting inside information, choosing
an interface to report such information, and limiting negative impact. We now explain
Pigeon’s guiding principles in response to these challenges.
Renounce killing. Reliable reports of failure are useful to applications because they
eliminate the need to handle uncertainty from a failure reporting service, and one
way to provide reliable reports of failure is through killing, either in effect [ ] or in
fact [ , ]. Killing requires a failure reporting service to judge whether some part
of the system is working, and these judgments can be wrong, thereby causing unnec-
essary damage. To make matters worse, killing can cause collateral damage whereby
many healthy processes are killed for the sake of giving reliable answers about a single
suspected process. To avoid the negative impacts of killing, Pigeon renounces violence
entirely.
Provide full coverage. Without killing, Pigeon can rely on the universal backstop: an
end-to-end timeout. is backstop is different from Falcon’s backstop because it does
not require communication among any components of the system. Using end-to-end
timeouts for common failures is a poor choice (as we argued in Chapter ), so Pigeon
still uses inside information for fast detection in the common case.
Expose uncertainty. Some inside information about failure is certain (e.g., a pro-
cess absent from a process table is certainly crashed), while other inside information
is not (e.g., a process present in the process table can be unresponsive to interprocess
communication). Exposing when Pigeon is certain about failures allows applications
to take qualitatively different recovery actions, for example by immediately selecting a
new leader instead of invoking a leader election algorithm. Applications must still han-
dle uncertainty, but this is not a burden as applications do so already when end-to-end
timeouts expire.
Design for extensibility. No implementation is ever perfect, so we design for exten-
sibility: Pigeon accommodates add-on modules that provide better information and
indicate different kinds of faults, potentially expanding the kinds of failures that it can
report quickly. ese extensions do not require redesigning Pigeon or applications; a
key factor in avoiding redesign is exposing failures through an abstraction, versus ex-
posing all details.
. Design of Pigeon
is section presents the interface exposed by Pigeon (§ . . ), describes the guaran-
tees (§ . . ), explains how Pigeon is used (§ . . ), describes its architecture (§ . . ),
and explains errors and their effects (§ . . ).
. . e failure informer interface
e failure informer interface exposes conditions to applications, where each condition
abstracts a class of problems in a remote target process that all affect the distributed
application in similar ways. ere are four conditions, shown in Figure . .
In Chapters and we argued in favor of reliable reports of failure because they can be used to
implement simpler distributed algorithms, but many existing applications already use majority-based
algorithms to handle uncertainty. Such algorithms can use Pigeon (or Falcon, or Albatross) directly.
condition occurred? permanent? description example causes




unreachability certain uncertain target unreachable network link down
stop warning expected;
imminent
certain target may stop
executing





uncertain target may become
unreachable
network link close to
capacity, overloaded
Figure . : Conditions reported by Pigeon. ese conditions abstract specific failures
affecting a remote target process and encapsulate two kinds of uncertainty.
. In a stop, the target process has stopped executing and lost its volatile state. e
problem has already occurred and it is permanent. is condition abstracts pro-
cess crashes, machine reboots, and similar problems.
. In an unreachability, the target process may be operational, but the client cannot
reach it. e problem has already occurred, but it is potentially intermittent. is
condition abstracts a timeout due to, say, a network partition or a slow process.
. In a stop warning, the target process may stop executing soon, as a critical resource
is missing or depleted. e problem has not yet occurred, but if it does occur it
is permanent. is condition abstracts cases such as a report about an imminent
disk failure [ , , ].
. In an unreachability warning, the target process may become unreachable soon, as
an important resource is missing or depleted. e problem has not yet occurred;
if it occurs, it is potentially intermittent. is condition abstracts cases such as
a network link being nearly saturated or overload in the host of the target
process.
e four conditions above reflect a classification based on two types of uncer-
tainty that are useful to applications: uncertainty in permanence (stop vs. unreachabil-
ity) and uncertainty in occurrence (actual vs. warning).
function description
h init(target, callback) request monitoring of target process; returns a handle
for use in future operations
uninit(h) stop monitoring
c query(h) get status; returns a list of conditions
res getProp(h, c, propname) get condition property value
startTimer(h, timeout) set/reset timer
stopTimer(h) cancel timer
Figure . : Pigeon’s programmatic interface.
e interface also returns properties: information specific to the condition, which
may help applications recover. A property of all conditions is their expected duration.
(Note that a duration estimate does not subsume certainty: certainty-vs-unreachability
captures a quality other than duration, and the duration estimate itself is fundamentally
uncertain. ) We describe how the duration property is set in Section . . . A property
of warning conditions is a bit vector indicating the critical resource(s) responsible for
the warning (disk, memory, CPU, network bandwidth, etc.).
Client API. Client applications use the interface in Figure . .
e client calls init() to monitor a target process, named by an IP address and
an application identifier in some name space (e.g., port space). e function returns
a handle referencing the target process which is used in other functions. e init()
function takes as a parameter a callback function, which the implementation calls as
new failure conditions emerge.
e query() function returns a (possibly empty) list of active conditions. e
getProp() function returns properties, described above.
e startTimer() and stopTimer() functions start and cancel end-to-end time-
outs. Clients use timeouts as a catch-all: if the client does not cancel or reset the timer
before it expires, Pigeon reports an unreachability condition.
In fact, a failure informer can report an unreachability with indefinite (unknown) duration. is is
different from a stop, which is known to be permanent.
. . Guarantees
We now describe the guarantees provided by Pigeon along three axes: coverage, accu-
racy, and timeliness. Pigeon provides these guarantees in spite of failures in both the
network and Pigeon itself, as described in Section . . .
Coverage. If a client uses Pigeon’s end-to-end timeout, Pigeon guarantees full cov-
erage: if a target process stops responding to the client, Pigeon reports either a stop or
an unreachability condition.
Accuracy. Pigeon’s accuracy guarantee means that any failure Pigeon reports is jus-
tified; we address the correctness of duration estimates in Section . . . We designed
Pigeon not for perfect accuracy in its reports but for accuracy in its certainty: Pigeon
knows when it knows, and it knows when it doesn’t know. Specifically, if Pigeon reports
a stop condition, the application client can safely assume that the target process will not
continue; Pigeon returns an unreachability when it cannot confirm that the condition
is permanent. When Pigeon reports a warning, it guarantees that a motive exists (some
fault occurred) but not that an unreachability or stop will occur.
Timeliness. If a condition occurs, Pigeon reports it as fast as it can. is is a “best
effort guarantee.”
. . Using the interface
We now give a general description of how applications might use Pigeon; Section . .
considers specific applications (RAMCloud [ ], Cassandra [ ], lease-based replica-
tion [ ]). For each of the four conditions, we explain the implications for the applica-
tion and how it could respond.
Recall that a stop condition indicates that the target process has lost its volatile
state and stopped executing permanently; this has both a quantitative and a qualitative
implication. Quantitatively, it is safe for the client to initiate recovery immediately.
Qualitatively, the client can use simpler recovery procedures: because it gets closure—
that is, because it knows that the target process has stopped—it does not have to handle
the case that the target process is alive. For example, a stop condition allows the client
to simply restart the target on a backup.
By contrast, an unreachability condition implies only that the target is unreach-
able; the target process may in fact be operational, or the condition may disappear by
itself. is has two implications. First, if the client takes a recovery action, the system
may have multiple instances of the target process. Recovering safely therefore requires
coordinating with other nodes using mechanisms like Chubby [ ], ZooKeeper [ ],
or Paxos [ ], which allow nodes to agree on a single master or action. Note that re-
ports of unreachability are still useful—and that using these agreement mechanisms is
not overly burdensome—because systems already have the appropriate logic: this is the
logic that handles the case that an end-to-end timeout fires without an actual failure.
Second, based on the expected duration of the condition, the application may
consider the costs and benefits of just waiting versus starting recovery proactively. Con-
ceptually, each application has an unavailability threshold such that if the expected dura-
tion of the condition is smaller, the application should wait; otherwise, it should start
recovery.
In fact, “eager recovery” can be taken a step further: warnings allow applications
to take precautionary actions even without failures. For example, a stop warning could
cause an application to bring a stand-by from warm to hot, while an unreachability
warning could cause an application to degrade its service.
To illustrate the use of Pigeon concretely, consider a synchronous primary-
backup system [ ], where the primary serves requests while a backup maintains an
up-to-date copy of the primary. e backup can use Pigeon to monitor the primary:
• If Pigeon reports a stop, the backup takes over;
• If Pigeon reports an unreachability, the backup must decide whether to fail over
the primary, or instantiate a new replica (either of which requires mechanisms to
prevent having multiple primaries), or simply wait. ese decisions must weigh
the cost of the recovery actions against the expected duration of the condition.
• If Pigeon reports a stop warning, the backup provisions a new replica without





























Figure . : Architecture of Pigeon. Pigeon has sensors (S), relays (R), and interpreters
(I). Sensors are component-specific. Sensors and relays are shared by multiple clients
and end-hosts; an interpreter is shared by all client applications on its host. e client
library presents the client API (§ . . ) to applications.
• Under an unreachability warning, the backup logs the warning so that, if the
condition is frequent, operators can better provision the system in the future.
. . Architecture of Pigeon
As stated in Chapter , Pigeon targets a data center network under a single adminis-
trative domain. Pigeon’s architecture is geared toward extracting and exploiting inside
information about failures already present in the system; for example, the failed links in
a network collectively yield information about a network partition. To use inside infor-
mation, Pigeon needs mechanisms to (a) sense information inside components, (b) relay
information to end-hosts, and (c) interpret information for client applications. ese
mechanisms are embodied, respectively, in sensors, relays, and interpreters (Figure . ).
We describe their abstract function below and their instantiations in our prototype in
Section . .
A sensor is component-specific and tailored; it is embedded in a component,
and detects faults in that component. A fault is a local event, possibly a malfunction,
that may contribute to one of the four failure conditions (§ . . ). A critical fault is one
that may lead to a stop condition; a regular fault, to an unreachability condition; and an
advisory fault, to a warning condition. Faults need not cause conditions; they may be
masked by recovery mechanisms outside the application (e.g., route convergence).
Relays communicate with sensors and propagate these sensors’ fault information
to end-hosts. Sensors and relays may be installed for Pigeon or may already exist in the
system.
Each end-host has an interpreter that receives information about faults from the
relays. Interpreters render this information as failure conditions and estimate the ex-
pected duration of conditions. Clients interact with interpreters through a client library,
which implements end-to-end timeouts and the client API (§ . . ). Interpreters also de-
termine which sensors are relevant to the client-supplied identifier for a target (§ . . ).
. . Coping with imperfect components
In this section we describe the effect of errors in Pigeon’s own components and the
network. ese errors include crash failures and misjudgments; they do not include
Byzantine failures, which Pigeon does not tolerate. Figure . summarizes the effect of
errors.
Before continuing, we note non-effects. First, Pigeon does not compromise on
coverage since it uses a backstop end-to-end timeout; this timeout is implemented in
the client library (linked into the application) and hence shares fate with the client
application, despite failures elsewhere. Second, Pigeon is designed to not compromise
safety, meaning that Pigeon guarantees stop conditions are reliable, by design (§ . ).
If a sensor, relay, or interpreter crashes or is disconnected from the network,
Pigeon loses access to inside information, which affects accuracy and timeliness (§ . ).
Loss of inside information also causes missed opportunities to report some failures




timeliness sensor, relay, or interpreter crashes
sensor misses fault
interpreter does not report stop or unreachability
accuracy sensor, relay, or interpreter crashes
sensor falsely detects regular or advisory fault
interpreter falsely reports unreachability or warning
Figure . : Effect of errors on Pigeon’s guarantees. Errors in duration estimates are
covered in Section . . .
triggered by the backstop end-to-end timeout.
Pigeon may need to rely on the backstop end-to-end timeout if a sensor does
not detect a fault, compromising timeliness. If a sensor falsely detects a regular fault,
then Pigeon may misreport an unreachability condition. is error in turn compro-
mises accuracy (potentially causing an unwarranted application recovery action) but
not safety, as Pigeon reports unreachability conditions as unreliable. e effect when a
sensor falsely detects an advisory fault is similar (misreports of warning conditions).
If the interpreter crashes or fails to report a condition, then Pigeon relies on
the end-to-end timeout, again compromising timeliness. If the interpreter misreports
an unreachability or warning, Pigeon compromises accuracy but not safety (as with a
sensor). Errors in the interpreter’s duration estimates are covered in Section . . .
We have designed Pigeon to be extensible so that new components can reduce
the errors above. However, Pigeon’s current components, which we describe next, al-
ready yield considerable benefits.
. Prototype of Pigeon
Wedescribe our target environment (§ . . ), and the implementations of sensors (§ . . ),
relays (§ . . ), and the interpreter (§ . . ) used in our prototype. e prototype bor-
rows many low-level mechanisms from prior work, as we will note, but the synthesis is
new (if unsurprising).
. . Target environment
Our prototype targets networks that use link-state routing protocols, which are common
in data centers and enterprises [ , ]. Currently, the prototype assumes the Open
Shortest Path First (OSPF) protocol [ ] with a single OSPF area or routing zone.
is assumption may raise scalability questions, which we address in Section . . . We
discuss multi-area routing and layer networks in Section . .
We assume a single administrative domain, where an operator can tune and
install our code in applications and routers; this tuning is required at deployment, not
during ongoing operation.
. . Sensors
Sensors must detect faults quickly and confirm critical faults; the latter requirement
ensures that Pigeon does not incorrectly report stops. e architecture accommodates
pluggable sensors, and our prototype includes four types: a process sensor and an embedded
sensor at end-hosts, and a router sensor and an OSPF sensor in routers. For each type, we
describe the faults that it detects, how it detects them, and how it confirms critical
faults. Faults are denoted F-⟨type⟩ (critical faults are noted in parentheses).
Process sensor. is sensor runs at end-hosts. When a monitored application starts
up, it connects to its local process sensor over a UNIX domain socket. e process
sensor resembles Falcon’s application spy (Chapter , Section . ), but it does not kill.
e sensor detects three faults:
F-exit (critical). e target process is no longer in the OS process table and
has lost its volatile state, but the OS remains operational. is fault can be caused by
a graceful exit, a software bug (e.g., segmentation fault), or an exogenous event (e.g.,
the process was killed by the out-of-memory killer on Linux). To detect this fault, the
sensor monitors its connection to the target processes. When a connection is closed, the
sensor checks the process table every Tproc-check time units; after confirming the target
process is absent, it reports F-exit. Our prototype sets Tproc-check to ms, a value small
enough to produce a fast report, but not so small as to clog the .
F-suspect-stop. e target process is in the process table but is not responding
to local probes. An example cause would be a bug that causes a deadlock in the target
process. To detect this fault, the sensor queries the monitored process every Tapp-check
time units. If the target process reports a problem or times out after Tapp-resp time units,
the sensor declares the fault. Our prototype sets Tapp-check to ms of real time and
Tapp-resp to ms of time of the monitored application (the same values are justified
in Chapter , Section . ).
F-disk-vulnerable. A disk used by the target process has failed or is vulnerable
to failure (based on vendor-specific reporting data such as [ ]). To detect this
fault, Pigeon checks the end-host’s data every Tdisk-check time units, which our
prototype sets to ms.
Embedded sensor. e next sensor is logic embedded in the end-host operating sys-
tems. is sensor resembles Falcon’s OS-layer spy but has additional logic to confirm
critical faults without killing. It detects three faults:
F-host-reboot (critical). e OS of the target process is rebooting. e embedded
sensor reports this fault during the shutdown that precedes a reboot, but only after all
of the processes monitored by Pigeon have exited (waiting prevents falsely reporting a
stop condition).
F-host-shutdown (critical). e OS of the target process is shutting down. e
sensor uses the same mechanism as for F-host-reboot.
F-suspect-stop. e OS of the target process is no longer scheduling a high pri-
ority process that increments a counter in kernel memory every Tinc time units (Fal-
con’s incrementer process, Ch. , § . ). e sensor detects a fault by checking that the
counter has incremented at least once every Tinc-check time units. Our prototype sets Tinc
and Tinc-check to ms and ms, respectively, providing fast detection of failures with
negligible cost (we borrow these settings from Falcon).
Router sensor. A process on the router implements a sensor that detects two faults:
F-suspect-stop.An end-host is no longer responding to network probes. is fault
could occur because of a power failure or an OS bug. e router sensor detects this fault
by running a keep-alive protocol with any attached end-hosts. ( is keep-alive protocol
is borrowed from Falcon.)
F-link-util.Anetwork link has high utilization. Our prototype checks the utiliza-
tion of the router’s links every Tutil time units and detects a fault if utilization exceeds a
fraction Fbw of the link bandwidth. Our prototype sets Fbw to % (which we measured
to be the lowest utilization at which a router starts to drop traffic in our testbed) and
Tutil to second (which corresponds to the maximum rate at which this fault can be
reported; see Section . . ).
OSPF Sensor. A router’s OSPF logic acts as a sensor that detects two faults:
F-link. A link in the network has gone down. e routers in our environment
detect link failures using Bidirectional-Forwarding Detection (BFD) [ ].
F-router-reboot.A network router is about to reboot. e sensor detects this fault
because the operating system notifies it that the router is about to reboot.
. . Relays
e prototype uses three kinds of relays: one at end-hosts, called a host relay, and two
at routers, called a router relay and an OSPF relay. Relays may be faulty, as discussed in
Section . . .
Host relay. is relay communicates faults detected by the process sensor, and it
runs in the same process as the process sensor. When a client begins monitoring a
target process, the client’s interpreter registers a callback at the target’s host relay. e
host relay invokes this callback whenever the process sensor detects a fault. Callbacks
improve timeliness, as the interpreter learns about faults soon after they happen; this
technique is used in other systems [ , ].
Router relay. is relay communicates the F-suspect-stop fault detected by the router
sensor, as well as all faults detected by the embedded sensors. e relay runs in the same
process as the router sensor, and it uses the same callback protocol as the host relay.
OSPF relay. is relay uses OSPF’s link-state routing protocol to communicate in-
formation about links. Under this protocol, routers generate information about their
links in Link-State Advertisements (LSAs) and propagate LSAs to other routers using
OSPF’s flooding mechanism. For link failures (F-link), the OSPF relay uses normal
LSAs, and for graceful shutdowns (F-router-reboot), the relay uses LSAs with infinite
distance [ ]. To announce overloaded links (F-link-util), the router relay uses opaque
LSAs [ ], which are LSAs that carry application-specific information.
Using the network to announce overload and failures might compound prob-
lems, so we rate-limit opaque LSAs to Ropaque, which our prototype sets to per second
(the maximum rate at which routers should accept LSAs [ ]). Similarly, a buggy client
could deplete the resources of the OSPF relay and the router relay, since these relays
are shared; mitigating such behavior is outside our current prototype’s scope, but stan-
dard techniques should apply (rate-limiting at the client, etc.). Note that the concern
is buggy clients, not malicious ones, because Pigeon targets a single administrative do-
main (as noted in Chapter ).
. . e interpreter
e interpreter gathers information about faults and outputs the failure conditions
of § . . . e interpreter must ( ) determine which sensors correspond to the client-
specified target process, ( ) decide if a condition is implied by a fault, ( ) estimate the
condition’s duration, ( ) report the condition to the application via the client library,
and ( ) guarantee that stop conditions are never falsely reported. We discuss these du-
ties in turn.
( ) e interpreter determines which sensors are relevant to a target process by using
knowledge of the network topology, the location of sensors, and the location of the
client and target processes.
( ) e interpreter must not report every fault as a condition; for example, a failed link
that is not on the client’s path to the target does not cause an unreachability condition. If
the interpreter cannot determine the effect of a fault from failure information alone, it
uses hints. For example, if a link becomes loaded along one of multiple paths to the target
process, the interpreter sends an ICMP Echo Request with the Explicit Congestion
Notification (ECN) option [ ] set, to determine if the client’s current path is affected.
e router sensors intercept these packets, and, if a link is loaded, mark them with the
Congestion Encountered (CE) bits. If the interpreter receives an EchoReply with these
bits set, or times out after Tprobe-to time units, the interpreter reports an unreachability
warning; in this warning, the network is marked as the critical resource (§ . . ). Our
implementation sets Tprobe-to to ms. e interpreter uses a similar hint (a network
probe packet) to determine the effect of link failures.
e interpreter determines which paths are available to clients by passively par-
ticipating in OSPF, a technique used in network monitoring [ , , ]. For detecting
link failures, this technique adds little overhead to the network; however, detecting link
utilization has additional overhead (because it generates extra LSAs), and OSPF itself
has some cost. We evaluate these costs in Section . . .
( ) As mentioned earlier, the interpreter estimates the duration of some unreachability
conditions. Currently, these durations are hard-coded based on our testbed measure-
ments, which we describe next; a better approach is to estimate duration using on-line
statistical learning.
Our prototype estimates the duration of unreachability conditions as follows.
If a link fails or a router reboots along the current path from the client to the target
process, but there are alternate working paths, the interpreter reports a duration of
Tnew-path-delay—the average time that the network takes to find and install the new path.
If a router reboots and there are no working paths from the client to the target process,
the client must wait for the router to reboot, so the interpreter reports a duration of
Trouter-reboot—the average time that the router takes to reboot. e interpreter reports all
other conditions as having an indefinite duration.
In our testbed, we set Tnew-path-delay and Trouter-reboot to . seconds and seconds,
respectively. We determine these values by measuring the unavailability caused by a
fault, as observed by a host pinging another every ms. In each experiment, we inject a
link failure or router reboot and measure the failure’s duration as the gap in ping replies
observed by the end-host. We repeat this experiment times for each fault. e means
We validate this timeout by running an experiment where one host sends an ICMP Echo Request
to another host for , iterations in a closed loop. We observe a response latency (which includes
round-trip time and packet processing time) of µs (standard deviation µs) and a maximum of
. ms, well below the timeout value.
Compared to existing failure reporting services, Pigeon improves, either in
coverage, accuracy, timeliness, or quality
§ . .
Pigeon’s richer information enables applications to react quickly or prevent
costly recoveries
§ . .
Pigeon uses negligible and moderate network bandwidth § . .
Figure . : Summary of main evaluation results.
are as reported; the standard deviations are ms and . seconds, respectively, for the
two conditions.
( ) e interpreter reports all conditions (and their expected duration) to the client
library; the interpreter also informs the client library if a condition clears or changes
expected duration. e client library in turn calls back the client, and also exposes active
conditions via the query() function (§ . . ).
( ) To avoid reporting false stop conditions, the interpreter reports a stop only for the
critical faults (F-exit, etc.), which sensors always confirm (by design).
. Experimental evaluation
We evaluate Pigeon by assessing its reports (§ . . ), its benefit to applications (§ . . ),
and its costs (§ . . ). Figure . summarizes the results.
Fully assessing Pigeon’s benefit would require running Pigeon against real-world
failure data. We do not have that data, and gathering it would be a separate study [ ].
Instead, we consider several real-world applications and failure scenarios, and show
Pigeon’s benefit for these instances.
Specifically, our evaluation compares our prototype to a set of baselines, in a
test network, under synthetic faults. e three baselines in our experiments are:
. End-to-end timeouts, set aggressively ( ms timeout on a ping sent every ms)
and to more usual values ( second timeout; ping every seconds).
. Falcon, with and without killing to confirm failure. We call the version without
killing Falcon-NoKill.
Figure . : Illustration of the testbed used in Pigeon’s evaluation.
. A set of Linux system call: send() invoked every ms, recv(), and epoll(), with
and without error queues.
Our test network has routers and physical hosts, each multiplexing up to
virtual machines (VMs). Our testbed appears in Figure . ; it comprises three pods
(gray circles), consisting of four routers (white circles) and hosts (white squares). is
is a fat-tree topology [ ], which we use to model a data center. Note that our operating
assumptions are data centers, fat-tree, and OSPF; these assumptions are compatible,
as data centers use OSPF. Our topology has the same scale as the one evaluated by
Al-Fares et al. (minus one pod), albeit with different hardware [ ].
Our routers are ASUS RT-N16s that run DD-WRT (basically Linux) [ ], and
use the Quagga networking suite [ ] patched to detect link failure with BFD [ ].
Our hypervisors run on three Dell PowerEdge T s, each with a quad-core Intel Xeon
. GHz processor, GB of RAM, and ten Gigabit Ethernet ports (four of which are
designated for VMs). e VMs are guests of QEMU v . and the KVM extensions
of the Linux . . -gentoo kernel. e guests run -bit Linux ( . . -gentoo-r ) and
have either MB of memory (labeled small) or MB of memory (large). Each
VM attaches to the network using the host’s Intel 82574L NIC, which it accesses via
PCI passthrough.
We do not expect much loss of fidelity in network performance from using VMs. e peak through-
put achieved by a benchmark tool, netperf [ ], is the same for a virtual and physical machine in our
testbed, and in our experiments, VMs do not contend for physical resources.
A non-assumption is using layer : there are data center architectures, based on fat-tree variants,
that use OSPF at layer [ ].
what problem is modeled? how is the fault injected?
process crash segmentation fault
host reboot issue reboot at host
link failure (backup paths exist) disable router port
link failures (partition) disable multiple router ports
router reboot (disrupts all paths) issue reboot at edge router
network load flood network path with burst
disk failure change SMART attributes [ ]
Figure . : Panel of modeled faults. e three groups should generate stop, unreacha-
bility, and warning reports, respectively.
Figure . lists the panel of faults in our experiments. Although the faults are
synthetic, the resulting failures model classes of actual problems.
. . How well does Pigeon do its job?
In this section, we first evaluate Pigeon’s reports and then the effect of duration esti-
mation error.
Multi-dimensional study. ere are many competing requirements in failure report-
ing; the challenge is not to meet any one of them but rather to meet all of them. us,
we perform a multi-dimensional study of Pigeon and the baselines.
Quantitatively, we investigate timeliness: for each pair of failure reporter and
fault, we perform runs in which a client process on a (small) VM monitors a target
process on another (small) VM in the same pod. We record the detection time as the
delay between when the apparatus issues an RPC (to fault injection modules on the
routers and hosts) and when the client receives an error report; if no report is received
within seconds, we record “not covered”. Qualitatively, we develop a rating system
of failure reporting features: certainty, ability to give warnings, etc.
Figure . depicts the comparison. Pigeon’s reports are generally of higher qual-









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































cost of Pigeon over ideal failure informer (sec)
small threshold
large threshold
Figure . : CDF of Pigeon’s cost over the ideal failure informer for two sample appli-
cations, with availability thresholds (§ . . ) smaller and larger than Pigeon’s duration
estimate.
so. And none of the baselines gives proactive warnings, as Pigeon does for the final two
faults in the panel. In Section . . , we investigate how these qualitative differences
translate into benefits for the application.
Pigeon’s reports are timely. For process crashes, single link failure, partition,
and router reboot, the mean detection times are ms, ms, ms, and ms. For
host reboots, Pigeon has a mean detection time of . seconds. (Detecting host reboot
takes longer because we measure from when the reboot command is issued, and there
is a delay before the reboot affects processes.)
Pigeon has full coverage in our experiments without needing the backstop end-
to-end timeout. We also find that Pigeon never incorrectly reports a fault that has not
occurred (a production deployment would presumably see some false reports and could
adjust its parameters should such reports become problematic; see Section . ). Next,
we consider the effect of duration estimation error in Pigeon’s reports.
Duration estimation error. To understand the effect of duration estimation error, we
compare our prototype to an ideal failure informer that predicts the exact duration of
a failure condition. Specifically, we measure the additional unavailability that Pigeon
causes in two applications: one that always recovers when using Pigeon because its
unavailability threshold (§ . . ) is smaller than Pigeon’s estimate (which is static; see
Section . . ), and one that always waits (because its threshold is higher).
We perform a simulation; we sample failure durations from a Weibull distribu-
tion (shape . , scale . ), which is heavy-tailed and intended to stress the prototype’s
static estimate by “spreading out” the range of actual failures. For each sample, we
record the cost, defined as the additional unavailability of the application when it uses
Pigeon versus when it uses the ideal. We model the application’s recovery duration and
availability threshold as equal to each other.
Figure . depicts the results. For the small threshold, Pigeon matches the ideal
for fewer than % of the samples because a significant fraction of the actual dura-
tions are very close to zero. Since this application always recovers with Pigeon, it fre-
quently incurs (unnecessary) unavailability from recovery: waiting out these short fail-
ures would have resulted in less unavailability. For the large threshold, Pigeon matches
the ideal for almost % of the samples but sometimes does much worse, since it waits
on a long tail of failure durations. However, both applications’ costs are capped, owing
to their backstop timeouts.
. . Does Pigeon benefit applications?
We consider three case study applications that use Pigeon differently: RAMCloud [ ],
Cassandra [ ], and lease-based replication [ ]. For each, we consider the unmodified
system, the system modified to use Pigeon, and the system modified to use one or more
baselines.
RAMCloud [ ]. RAMCloud is a storage system that stores data in DRAM at a
set of master servers, which process client requests. RAMCloud replicates data on the
disks of multiple backup servers, for durability. To reduce unavailability after a master
server fails, a coordinatormanages recovery to reconstruct data from the backups quickly.
ere are two notable aspects of RAMCloud for our purposes. First, although recovery
is fast, it is expensive (it draws data from across the system, and it ejects the server,
reducing capacity). Second, RAMCloud has an aggressive timeout: it detects failures
by periodically pinging other servers at random and then timing out after ms.
RAMCloud using
fault timeout Falcon Pigeon
process crash . s, eject . s, eject . s, eject
host reboot . s, eject . s, eject . s, eject
link failure (no partition) . s, eject . s, wait . s, wait
link failures (partition) . s, eject ∞, wait . s, eject
router reboot . s, eject ∞, wait . s, eject
network load ∞, eject . s, wait . s, wait
Figure . : Mean unavailability observed by a RAMCloud client when RAMCloud
uses different detection mechansims (standard deviations are within % of means).
We also note whether RAMCloud ejects a server or waits for the fault to clear. Pigeon
is roughly as timely as highly aggressive timeouts but can save RAMCloud the cost of
recovery (specifically, under link failure (no partition) and network load faults). Fal-
con [ ] hangs on network failures, so RAMCloud Falcon does too (represented with
∞). Using timeouts, RAMCloud sometimes hangs if network load triggers multiple
recoveries.
us, we expect that unmodified RAMCloud recovers more often than needed,
and that Pigeon could help it begin recovery quickly or avoid recovering; we also expect
that Pigeon can offer this benefit while providing full coverage and timely information.
To investigate, we modify RAMCloud servers to use Pigeon and Falcon (with long
backstop timeouts that do not fire in these experiments). We run a RAMCloud cluster
on six large VMs (one client, five servers; two VMs in each pod), where each server
stores MB of data. is configuration allows RAMCloud to recover quickly on our
testbed, at the cost of ejecting a server. For each injected fault, we perform iterations
and measure the gap in response time that is seen by a client querying in a closed loop.
Figure . depicts the results. Pigeon is roughly as timely as very aggressive
timeouts, deriving its timeliness from sensors. Pigeon also enables RAMCloud to forgo
recovery when possible. For instance, RAMCloud waits under network load when it
receives a warning from Pigeon. Under a link failure, RAMCloud receives an unreach-
ability condition with a short duration (equal to the network convergence time), so it
waits. By contrast, under router reboot, RAMCloud receives an unreachability condi-
























Figure . : Cassandra’s read throughput with and without Pigeon, after a network link
fails seconds into the run, temporarily disrupting a single server. Using Pigeon, the
Cassandra snitch avoids using an unreachable replica; without Pigeon, Cassandra waits
for the server to become reachable again. is example is representative: in our exper-
iments, clients observed a mean unavailability of second (σ < 0.1) using Pigeon and
. seconds (σ = 1.3) using the unmodified snitch.
Cassandra [ ]. Cassandra [ ] is a distributed key-value storage system used widely
(e.g., at Netflix, Cisco, and Reddit [ ]). Cassandra servers read data from a primary
replica and request digests from the other replicas. us, the choice of primary is impor-
tant: if the primary has a problem, the server blocks until the problem is solved or the
request times out. A server chooses as its primary the replica with the lowest expected
request latency, as reported by an endpoint snitch.
We expect that Pigeon could help a snitch make better server selections. To
measure this benefit, we run a client in a closed loop, inject two faults (network load
and link failure) at a server in a five-server cluster (using large VMs), and measure the
throughput.
Under network load (not depicted), the unmodified snitch and the Pigeon snitch
offer comparable (and significant) benefit over no snitch, as the unmodified snitch’s de-
cisions are based on latencies—but only if the network is working. Figure . depicts
the behavior in the case of link failure: here, Pigeon’s report to the snitch allows the
server to quickly choose a better primary, resulting in higher throughput. Compared
with RAMCloud: Pigeon lets Cassandra act more quickly than it otherwise would (be-
cause Pigeon reports the case and because switching is cheap), whereas this same report
lets RAMCloud wait when it would otherwise act.
Lease-based replication [ ]. A common approach to replication is to use a lease
server [ , , ], which grants a lease to a master replica, which in turn handles client
requests, forwarding them to backups. If a backup detects or suspects a failure, it tries to
become the master, by requesting a lease from the lease server. However, this process
is delayed by the time remaining on the lease.
We expect that Pigeon’s stop reports would be particularly useful here: they
report that a lease holder has crashed with certainty, which allows the system to break
the lease, increasing system availability. To investigate, we build a demo replication
application and lease server, which offers -second leases, and run it with and without
Pigeon. We run a client ( iterations) that issues queries in a closed loop, measuring
the response gap seen by the client after we inject a process crash at the master.
e results are unsurprising (but encouraging): the response gap measured at
the client averages . seconds (standard deviation . seconds) when using Pigeon,
versus . seconds (standard deviation . seconds) using unmodified lease expiration.
Which applications do not gain fromPigeon? We considered simple designs for many
applications; Pigeon usually provides a benefit but sometimes not. For example, a DNS
client can use Pigeon to monitor its DNS server and quickly failover to a backup server
when it encounters a problem. However, because the client’s recovery is lightweight
(retry the request), there is little benefit over using short end-to-end timeouts, since the
cost of inaccuracy is low. Some applications do not make use of any information about
failures; such applications likewise do not gain from Pigeon. For example, NFS (on
Linux) has a hard-mount mode, in which the NFS client blocks until it can communicate
with its NFS server; this NFS client does not expose failures or act on them. However,
such applications are not our target since they consciously renounce availability.
Note that Falcon would also enable such lease-breaking, but Falcon is incompatible with the avail-
ability requirement: if the problem is in the network, a query to Falcon literally hangs.
component (§ . ) detecting network load idle
used at end-hosts
process sensor/host relay . % . %
embedded sensor . % . %
interpreter . % . %
used at routers
router sensor/relay . % . %
OSPF sensor/relay . % . %
bandwidth used
at each end-host . kbps bps
at each router . kbps . kbps
Figure . : Resource overheads of our Pigeon implementation.
. . What are Pigeon’s costs?
Implementation costs. Pigeon has lines of C and Java. Sensors are compact,
and the system is easy to extend (e.g., the disk failure logic required only lines).
Integrating Pigeon into applications is easy: it required lines for RAMCloud and
lines for Cassandra.
and network overheads. Figure . shows the resource costs of Pigeon.
use is small; the main cost is a high-priority process in the embedded sensor, which
periodically increments a shared counter (§ . . ). Pigeon’s network overheads come
from OSPF LSAs to hosts.
Scalability. e main limiting factor is bandwidth to propagate failure data; this over-
head is inherited from OSPF, which generates a number of LSAs proportional to the
number of router-to-router links in the network. is overhead is reasonable for net-
works with thousands of routers and tens of thousands of hosts. Specifically, we es-
timate that in a -port fat-tree topology with routers and , end-hosts [ ],
OSPF would use less than . Mbps of bisection bandwidth (or . % of Gbps capac-
ity), which is consistent with our smaller-scale measurements. Larger networks would
presumably use multiple areas; we briefly discuss extending Pigeon to that setting in
the next section.
. Discussion
Wenow consider assumptions and limitations of the failure informer abstraction (§ . . –
§ . . ), the Pigeon architecture (§ . . ), and our prototype implementation (§ . ).
e abstraction. As with any abstraction, this one is based on generalizing from spe-
cific difficult cases, on judgment, and on use cases. It is hard to prove that an abstraction
is optimal (but ours is better than at least our own previous attempts). A critique is
that an implementation of the abstraction is permitted to return spurious “uncertain”
reports. However, uncertainty is fundamental and hence some wrong answers are in-
evitable (§ . ); thus, this critique is really a requirement that the implementation have
few false positives (§ . . ).
e architecture. Our architecture assumes a single administrative domain. is sce-
nario has value because many data centers satisfy this assumption, but extending to a
federated context may be worthwhile. However, this requires additional research; prior
work gives a starting point [ , , , , ].
One benefit of Pigeon’s architecture is that it can be shared across many different
applications, with different purposes. For example, Pigeon could be integrated into an
existing group communication service [ , ], a configuration management service [ ,
], or even a new failure reporting service that uses majority-based techniques to kill
when Pigeon reports an unreachability.
e prototype. Our prototype assumes OSPF, runs on layer , and monitors only
end-hosts and routers (not middleboxes). We designed Pigeon for extensibility, so
expanding it to other routing protocols would require implementing appropriate re-
lays and sensors (§ . . –§ . . ). We could also extend to layer- networks, either with
OSPF (some layer- architectures run OSPF for routing [ ]), or without; in the latter
case, the prototype would need different sensors and relays. Another extension is to
monitor middleboxes using additional types of sensors. Neither our current prototype
nor these extensions requires structural network changes. ( e logic for sensors and
relays is small and runs in software, on a router’s or switch’s control processor.)
We estimated our prototype’s scalability in Section . . : it ought to scale to tens
of thousands of hosts in a single area, with the limit coming from OSPF itself. OSPF
can scale to more hosts, by using multiple areas; we could extend Pigeon to this case
using additional sensors and relays at area borders to address what would otherwise be
a loss of accuracy (since areas are opaque to each other). We leave this for future work.
Chapter
Summary & Outlook
. Revisiting the three challenges
In Chapter , we presented three challenges in building a fast failure reporting service
that uses inside information: systematically collecting inside information, defining an
interface for reporting failures, and limiting negative impact. We now examine the
trade-offs in the choices made by the three failure reporting services described in this
dissertation, Falcon (Chapter ), Albatross (Chapter ), and Pigeon (Chapter ).
Systematically collecting inside information. Each failure reporting service gathers
inside information by periodically checking components locally, or by re-purposing ex-
isting monitoring infrastructure. e services differ in how they get this information
back to clients. Falcon exclusively uses callbacks to communicate inside information,
while Albatross sometimes relies on network-level broadcast when there is a host fail-
ure or network partition. Pigeon uses a network of relays to communicate inside infor-
mation; some of these relays communicate among themselves, while others call back
directly to Pigeon’s interpreter.
e reason for these differences is in the scope of monitored components. Fal-
con monitors components located at end-hosts, whereas Albatross and Pigeon addition-
ally monitor the health of the network. Because every client of Albatross and Pigeon
monitors the network, using Falcon’s register-callback architecture would require state
at either the manager (in Albatross) or at each of the routers (in Pigeon) for every
client. us, Albatross uses broadcast (so the manager need not track active clients)
and Pigeon piggybacks on OSPF (to avoid having every client monitor every router
directly).
Defining an interface for reporting failures. Our work on this dissertation began in
search of a perfect failure detector [ ], one that eventually detects every failure and guar-
antees that a “down” report means that a process has crashed. In Falcon, we settled for
a service with a reliable failure detector interface, where “down” reports have the same
guarantee (though Falcon may have caused the crash) and failures are always reported—
when there is network connectivity. Because of this choice, Falcon has two disadvan-
tages: Falcon itself sometimes causes crashes, and Falcon cannot handle network fail-
ures. To keep the benefits of the reliable failure detector interface while addressing
these disadvantages, we designed Albatross. Instead of killing components, Albatross
blocks processes from using the network, which softens the blow of interference. is
choice also allows Albatross to provide asymmetric guarantees about disconnection de-
spite common network partitions. Pigeon forgoes making all failure reports reliable
thereby allowing it to renounce interference; Pigeon instead exposes to applications its
certainty about a problem. is choice allows applications to make qualitatively differ-
ent recovery choices, which can reduce the unavailability caused by failures. ere may
be other, better ways of exposing failure information, but our experience shows that
these interfaces benefit applications.
Limiting negative impact. All three services limit their overheads by polling locally
at relatively low rates (tens of checks per second), and by sharing this work among all
clients. e services differ in how they handle uncertain information. Falcon has the
greatest negative impact because it kills, and, although Falcon aims to kill surgically, it
sometimes kills at the granularity of machines. Albatross lowers this burden by discon-
necting processes at the network level but pays for this reduction by consuming scarce
resources in switch memory. Pigeon eliminates the impact of killing entirely.
. Choosing from the aviary
Two factors determine which bird is the best choice: ( ) the client applications, and
( ) the target environment. We examine these considerations in turn.
e failure reporting service’s interface determines how easily it can be used by
existing applications. Client applications can most readily use Falcon because it has
a familiar failure detector interface that is already used by many applications (e.g.,
Facebook’s Cassandra [ ] or LinkedIn’s Voldemort [ ]). Albatross also has a familiar
binary interface, and can be used in-place of an existing failure detector—assuming the
application developer understands Albatross’s asymmetric guarantees. Pigeon’s failure
informer interface makes it the most difficult to integrate with applications (though
it was not overly burdensome; see Chapter , Section . ) since developers need to
understand the difference between a stop condition and an unreachability condition, as
well as how to determine an “unavailability threshold.” Despite these difficulties, Pigeon
offers more benefit than Falcon or Albatross from inside information since Pigeon can
report intermittent conditions (like temporary load).
All three services require the ability to modify end-host software, and they each
require different modifications to the network. To detect end-host failures, Falcon re-
quires the ability to run arbitrary software on top of rack switches, though recent work
(e.g., Sidecar [ ]) could relax this requirement. In contrast, Albatross requires an ab-
stract programmable interface from the network so that its manager can detect, enforce,
and report partitions. Because Pigeon gathers more information from the network than
either Falcon or Albatross, it requires the ability to run arbitrary code on all network
routers (to detect congestion) and the ability to snoop on network protocols (to detect
link failures).
. Next steps
A fast failure reporting service lets distributed systems respond more quickly to failure,
and the quality of its reports can help the system to make better recovery decisions.
Nevertheless, several steps remain before any of these birds can fly free and be used in
production systems.
First, a small scale real-world deployment is needed to measure the presence and
impact of false positives in local monitoring. Such a deployment would help to validate
the approach of using inside information to detect failures but would require access to
production data centers (beyond what is usually granted to academic research).
Second, distributed systems that run on data center networks are beginning to
span multiple data centers, bringing concerns of handling additional delays and failures
of wide-area networks. In particular, Albatross’s current approach would excluded one
data center from another in order to provide Albatross’s asymmetric guarantees; using
Albatross to handle wide-area problems would likely involve extending its guarantees
to differentiate between small partitions (its current assumption) and large partitions.
Finally, each of these failure reporting services exposes an interface that is not
commonly assumed in distributed systems; this presents a challenge and an opportu-
nity. e challenge is incorporating these services into existing code, either by factoring
out an application’s failure detection logic or replacing it in-line. e opportunity is us-
ing both sub-second detection time and better information about failures to develop
new recovery strategies for improving fault tolerance.
. Conclusion
One take-away from this dissertation is that using inside information can help dis-
tributed systems better respond to failures. However, this take-away is an unsurprising
instantiation of a general rule in systems design: lower-level interfaces often perform
better than higher-level interfaces—but with more difficulty in their use. e more
important take-aways from this dissertation are the considerations in using inside in-
formation, such as the costs of interference and the granularity at which inside infor-
mation is presented to applications. us, we hope that the lasting contribution of this
dissertation is motivating infrastructure providers (data centers, cloud services, etc.) to
implement fast failure reporting.
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